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READING TOO MUCH INTO WHAT THE COURT 
DOESN’T WRITE: HOW SOME FEDERAL COURTS 
HAVE LIMITED TITLE VII’S PARTICIPATION 
CLAUSE’S PROTECTIONS AFTER CLARK COUNTY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT V. BREEDEN 
Lawrence D. Rosenthal*  
Abstract: In 2001, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Clark County School District 
v. Breeden, in which it refused to determine what a plaintiff must prove to demonstrate that 
she engaged in “protected activity” under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision’s opposition 
clause. Although the Court declined to answer this question, courts have interpreted Breeden 
as requiring an opposition-clause plaintiff to prove a good-faith, objectively reasonable belief 
of an unlawful employment practice. Although Breeden involved Title VII’s opposition 
clause, some courts are now applying Breeden to cases involving Title VII’s participation 
clause. This is baffling for two reasons. First, Breeden involved the opposition clause, not the 
participation clause, and prior to Breeden, federal courts had concluded that the participation 
clause provided more protection than the opposition clause provided. Second, Breeden never 
definitively established the standard for opposition-clause cases. Despite this, some courts 
are now applying Breeden’s objectively reasonable standard to participation-clause cases. 
This Article argues that courts should not apply Breeden in participation-clause cases and 
should protect participation-clause plaintiffs even if the plaintiffs’ beliefs about unlawful 
employment practices are unreasonable. Courts should do this because of (1) the 
participation clause’s plain language; (2) the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
(EEOC) position on this issue; (3) the canon of statutory construction that requires remedial 
statutes such as Title VII to be interpreted broadly; and (4) the fact that Breeden neither 
addressed the participation clause nor provided a definitive standard for opposition-clause 
cases. 
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In addition to prohibiting employers from discriminating against 
employees based upon “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,”1 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) prohibits employers 
from discriminating against employees who “participate[]” in 
proceedings brought under Title VII or against individuals who 
                                                     
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
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“oppose[]” practices made unlawful by Title VII.2 These prohibitions, 
found in Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, protect two types of 
activities. The anti-retaliation provision’s participation clause protects 
employees who file charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), testify regarding claims brought under Title VII, 
assist in proceedings brought under Title VII, or participate “in any 
manner” in Title VII proceedings.3 The anti-retaliation provision’s 
opposition clause protects employees who oppose or protest an 
employer’s unlawful employment practices or who engage in other 
“opposition” activities without resorting to the EEOC.4 
The Supreme Court has indicated that Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision is critical to Title VII’s effectiveness, and that without an 
effective anti-retaliation provision, Title VII’s substantive prohibitions 
would suffer.5 As a result, prior to its opinion in Clark County School 
                                                     
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Plaintiffs bringing suit under either clause of Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision do not have to prevail on the underlying discrimination claim in order to 
prevail on their retaliation claims. See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE 97–98 (2001). For an example of a case in 
which a court determined that claims brought pursuant to the opposition clause require only a 
reasonable, good-faith belief that the employer’s conduct is unlawful, see Jordan v. Alternative 
Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 340 (4th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006), 
cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2036 (2007). For a case in which a court determined that 
conduct is protected under the participation clause regardless of whether the plaintiff wins the 
underlying claim, see Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir. 2000). 
3. § 2000e-3(a). 
4. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8-II (1998), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.html [hereinafter Compliance Manual]. According to the 
Compliance Manual, specific examples of protected opposition include: (1) threatening to file a 
charge or other formal complaint alleging discrimination; (2) threatening to file a complaint with the 
EEOC, an equivalent state agency, union, court, or any other entity that receives complaints relating 
to discrimination; (3) complaining about alleged discrimination against oneself or against others; (4) 
refusing to obey an order because of a reasonable belief that it is discriminatory; and (5) requesting 
a reasonable accommodation or religious accommodation. Id. The Compliance Manual does not 
provide as many examples of protected participation, but it does provide that the participation clause 
applies to “individuals challenging employment discrimination under the statutes enforced by 
EEOC in EEOC proceedings, in state administrative or court proceedings, as well as in federal court 
proceedings.” Id. The Compliance Manual also echoes the statutory language that indicates that 
activities such as (1) filing a charge; (2) testifying; (3) assisting; or (4) “participat[ing] in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, hearing, or litigation under Title VII, the ADEA, the EPA, 
or the ADA” are protected activities. Id. 
5. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63–64 (2006). The Court 
noted that a narrow construction of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision would “fail to fully achieve 
the anti-retaliation provision’s ‘primary purpose,’ namely, ‘maintaining unfettered access to 
statutory remedial mechanisms.’” Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 
(1997)). The Court further noted that “[i]nterpreting the anti-retaliation provision to provide broad 
protection from retaliation helps assure the cooperation upon which accomplishment of the Act’s 
primary objective depends.” Id. at 67; see also Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346 (holding that Title VII’s 
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District v. Breeden,6 the Supreme Court and all federal courts had 
usually granted broad protection to employees seeking protection under 
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.7 One way in which courts had 
given this broad protection was by allowing plaintiffs to succeed in 
retaliation claims even if they lost their substantive discrimination 
claims.8 Thus, even if plaintiffs’ discrimination claims failed, the 
plaintiffs could still prevail on their retaliation claims.9 This protection, 
however, has not been unlimited, as federal courts have concluded that 
the anti-retaliation provision’s protections are not absolute.10 
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the scope of the 
opposition clause’s protection when it decided Breeden. In Breeden, the 
Court addressed whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case of 
retaliation under Title VII’s opposition clause.11 The Court concluded 
that the plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case, because she was 
unable to prove that her complaint to her supervisors constituted 
“protected activity,” the first element of a prima facie case under the 
anti-retaliation provision.12 In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
                                                     
anti-retaliation provision applies to former employees as well as to current employees in part 
because a narrower interpretation would undermine Title VII’s effectiveness). 
6. 532 U.S. 268 (2001). 
7. See, e.g., Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 65 (relying on the EEOC’s position that Title VII’s 
anti-retaliation provision should provide “exceptionally broad protection.”). See also Robinson, 519 
U.S. at 346, where the Court extended anti-retaliation protection to former employees, despite the 
fact that the anti-retaliation provision’s language did not explicitly include former employees within 
the scope of its protection. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
8. See LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 2, at 97–98 (citing cases). This interpretation is in conflict 
with the statute’s plain language, which protects employees from retaliation based on an employee’s 
opposition to “any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added). However, courts have given a broader interpretation to that clause 
than its plain language would suggest. See supra text accompanying note 2. 
9. LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 2, at 97–98. 
10. See, e.g., Breeden, 532 U.S. at 270 (suggesting, but not deciding, that only objectively 
reasonable beliefs that employment practices are unlawful are protected under the opposition clause 
of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision); Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 343 (4th 
Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2036 
(2007) (rejecting an employee’s opposition-clause claim because it was not based on an objectively 
reasonable belief that the employer’s conduct violated Title VII); Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 
F.3d 885, 892 (7th Cir. 2004) (concluding that Breeden’s objectively reasonable standard applies to 
claims brought under the anti-retaliation provision’s participation clause). 
11. See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 269. When addressing the issue of whether the plaintiff established 
this prima facie case, the Court had the opportunity to decide what standard applied when 
determining whether a plaintiff engaged in protected activity under the opposition clause; however, 
as will be discussed in Part IV of this Article, the Court specifically declined to decide that issue. Id. 
at 270. 
12. Id. at 271. As will be discussed infra Part I, a plaintiff in a retaliation case must prove that (1) 
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determined that no reasonable person could have concluded that the 
comment in question violated Title VII, and that the plaintiff’s 
complaints about that remark were, therefore, not protected activity.13 
Importantly, the Court did not decide the standard for determining what 
constitutes protected activity under the opposition clause;14 however, 
federal courts that have addressed this issue since Breeden have come to 
require a showing that the plaintiff’s belief that he was opposing an 
unlawful employment practice was objectively reasonable.15 A 
plaintiff’s good-faith, but unreasonable, belief of an unlawful 
employment practice is no longer protected,16 as it had been in some 
jurisdictions prior to Breeden.17 
Another result of Breeden is that some federal courts now apply this 
objectively reasonable standard to cases involving Title VII’s 
participation clause.18 This development is somewhat unexpected 
because before Breeden, courts held that the participation clause’s 
protections were more broad than those afforded by the opposition 
clause.19 However, since Breeden, some courts do not distinguish 
between the two clauses, and they apply Breeden’s objectively 
reasonable standard to opposition-clause cases and to participation-
clause cases.20 This development is baffling for two reasons. First, the 
                                                     
he engaged in a protected activity; (2) his employer was aware of the protected activity; (3) he 
suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) there was a causal connection between the 
protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Brian A. Riddell & Richard A. Bales, 
Adverse Employment Actions in Retaliation Cases, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 313, 315 (2005). 
13. See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271. 
14. Id. at 270. 
15. For a thorough discussion of this issue, see generally Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or 
Not To Report: The Case for Eliminating the Objectively Reasonable Requirement for Opposition 
Activities Under Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127 (2007). 
16. See Breeden, 532 U.S. 268. 
17. See, e.g., Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 385 (10th Cir. 1984) (citing cases 
holding that a plaintiff’s activity is protected so long as it is based on a his or her good-faith belief 
that Title VII has been violated). 
18. See, e.g., Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006); Gilooly v. Mo. 
Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 421 F.3d 734, 744 (8th Cir. 2005) (Colloton, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 892 (7th Cir. 2004); Neely v. City 
of Broken Arrow, No 4:07CV00018, 2007 WL 1574762, at *2 (N.D. Okla. May 29, 2007). 
19. See, e.g., Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994); Booker v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989); Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 
588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978). 
20. See infra Parts V.A and V.B. Some courts have not yet decided whether a reasonable, good-
faith belief of an unlawful employment practice is required in order to gain protection under Title 
VII’s participation clause. See, e.g., Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1455 (11th 
Cir. 1998) (stating that because the facts viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff 
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Court in Breeden was not even confronted with which standard applied 
under the participation clause.21 Second, the Court in Breeden never 
definitively stated that an objectively reasonable standard was required 
under the opposition clause.22 Despite this, some courts have begun to 
limit the participation clause’s protection and to require that before 
participation-clause plaintiffs receive protection, they must prove that 
their participation was reasonable.23 
These courts now make it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in 
participation-clause cases; however, there are many reasons why courts 
should not impose this objectively reasonable requirement on 
participation-clause plaintiffs. First, Title VII’s language supports a 
broad interpretation of the participation clause, an interpretation that 
would not require an objectively reasonable standard.24 Second, the 
EEOC has expressed its opinion that the participation clause should 
provide extremely broad protection to employees, and that it should 
provide protection even in cases in which a plaintiff’s participation is 
unreasonable.25 Third, a narrow interpretation conflicts with the canon of 
statutory construction that remedial statutes should be interpreted 
                                                     
demonstrated that the plaintiff did have a good-faith, reasonable basis for filing her charge, the court 
“need not decide whether protection from retaliation under the participation clause is conditioned by 
a good faith, reasonable basis requirement.”). Despite this lack of a clear answer from the Eleventh 
Circuit, at least one United States district court from within the Eleventh Circuit has suggested that a 
good-faith requirement applies to participation-clause activities. In Belt v. Alabama Historical 
Commission, No. Civ.A. 04-0331-WSM, 2005 WL 1653728, at *9 (S.D. Ala. July 12, 2005), aff’d, 
181 F. App’x 763 (11th Cir. 2006), the court noted that “all that matters is whether [the] plaintiff 
testified in good faith at her deposition in February 2003 because it is that deposition that [the] 
plaintiff characterizes as a statutorily protected act.” Because testifying at a deposition would fall 
under the participation clause rather than the opposition clause, it appears that the court applied a 
good-faith requirement to participation-clause activities. 
21. See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 270. The second part of the Breeden opinion did, in fact, address the 
participation clause; however, that part of the opinion did not focus on the issue of which standard 
should be used to determine whether a plaintiff engaged in protected activity under either clause of 
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. See id. at 271–74. 
22. Id. at 270. One possible reading of the Court’s opinion is that if it did answer the question, the 
Court would have applied a strict interpretation of the statute and would have required that there be 
an actual unlawful employment practice before a retaliation plaintiff could prevail. This, of course, 
would have conflicted with most other precedent because, at the time the Court decided Breeden, no 
courts required an actual unlawful employment practice as a prerequisite for a retaliation plaintiff to 
prevail. But see EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 306 (M.D. Ga. 1975), for an 
early case in which the court did require an actual violation. 
23. See discussion infra Parts V.A–B. 
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). Specifically, the statute provides protection for 
individuals who participate “in any manner” in a Title VII investigation, proceeding, or hearing. 
25. See Compliance Manual, supra note 4, at § 8-II. 
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broadly.26 Finally, courts should not apply Breeden to participation-
clause cases because, as was previously noted, Breeden did not address 
the participation clause and never definitively determined the proper 
standard for opposition-clause cases.27 
This Article will first examine, in Part I, Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision, including the opposition clause and the participation clause.28 
Part II will address opposition-clause cases and Breeden’s effect on 
them,29 while Part III of this Article will describe how the courts 
analyzed participation-clause cases pre-Breeden.30 Part IV of this Article 
will briefly analyze the Breeden opinion.31 Part V will address post-
Breeden cases and how courts have applied Breeden to participation-
clause cases.32 Finally, Part VI of this Article will argue that using the 
objectively reasonable standard for both types of cases is inappropriate, 
and that the courts that have rejected Breeden in the participation-clause 
context have correctly analyzed this issue.33 At the very least, if courts 
are going to treat these cases similarly, they should not require the 
objectively reasonable standard, but rather they should require only that 
anti-retaliation-clause plaintiffs oppose or participate in good faith.34 
However, before explaining why that option is preferable to an across-
the-board reasonableness requirement in all retaliation cases, this Article 
will explain Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. 
                                                     
26. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm’rs v. EEOC, 405 F.3d 840, 847 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting 
that Title VII is a broad remedial statute and should be construed liberally); Charlton v. Paramus 
Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 199–200 (3d Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that the anti-retaliation 
provision of Title VII should be broadly construed to further the goal of preventing employer 
retaliation). 
27. 532 U.S. at 270–72. There are other reasons why courts should not apply Breeden to 
participation-clause cases, many of which are discussed in the context of the opposition clause in 
Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 1149–76. Some of these reasons include (1) the fact that most 
employees are not familiar with the intricacies of employment discrimination law, and they should 
not be held to a high, reasonableness standard; (2) applying Breeden to the participation clause 
would discourage employees from coming forward with discrimination complaints and would also 
cause employees to be hesitant to support other employees’ discrimination complaints; and (3) using 
a reasonableness standard will result in inconsistent outcomes for cases with similar facts. See id. 
28. See discussion infra Part I. 
29. See discussion infra Part II. 
30. See discussion infra Part III. 
31. See discussion infra Part IV. 
32. See discussion infra Part V. 
33. See discussion infra Part VI. 
34. I made this argument regarding the opposition clause in Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 1149–77. 
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I. TITLE VII’S ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION AND HOW 
THE FEDERAL COURTS ANALYZE CLAIMS BROUGHT 
UNDER THIS PROVISION 
Like most state anti-discrimination statutes and other federal anti-
discrimination statutes, Title VII prohibits employers from 
discriminating against employees because the employees opposed what 
they reasonably believed to be unlawful employment practices or 
because they participated in proceedings brought under the statute.35 
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision provides as follows: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for 
employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-
management committee controlling apprenticeships or other 
training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to 
discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization 
to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for 
membership, because he has opposed any practice made an 
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he 
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
subchapter. 36 
According to the statute’s language, two types of activities are 
protected—opposition and participation.37 The participation clause, 
which is the focus of this Article, protects employees who file EEOC 
charges or who testify or assist in EEOC investigations, proceedings, 
and hearings.38 This clause also protects employees who “participate[] in 
any manner” in investigations, hearings, or proceedings brought 
                                                     
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). For example, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
also has an anti-retaliation provision. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2000). The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act also has an anti-retaliation provision. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2000). For an example 
of a state anti-discrimination statute’s anti-retaliation provision, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, 
§ 4(4) (1999). Although similar to Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, the Massachusetts statute’s 
language does have some differences. See Morris v. Boston Edison Co., 942 F. Supp. 65, 70 (D. 
Mass. 1996). See also FLA. STAT. § 760.10(7) (1992) (the Florida Civil Rights Act), which provides 
protection to individuals who either oppose unlawful employment practices or participate “in any 
manner” in state anti-discrimination proceedings. Because the language of this provision is nearly 
identical to Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, Florida courts interpret the provisions similarly. 
See Hinton v. Supervision Int’l., Inc., 942 So. 2d 986, 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
37. See id. 
38. See id. 
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pursuant to Title VII.39 As will be addressed later, this “in any manner” 
language is one reason why courts should grant broad protection to 
participation-clause plaintiffs.40 However, there are additional reasons 
why courts should provide extremely broad protection to these 
individuals.41 
The opposition clause is a bit more general, as it provides protection 
to employees who “oppose[]” what they reasonably believe to be 
unlawful employment practices under Title VII.42 Under this clause, 
employees are protected from retaliation if they complained about, 
opposed, or questioned an employer’s employment practice.43 There are 
also several other types of protected “opposition” conduct covered by 
this provision.44 
To establish a prima facie case under either clause, the plaintiff is 
required to prove four elements.45 He must prove: first, that he engaged 
in a “protected activity;” second, that the employer was aware of the 
protected activity;46 third, that he suffered an “adverse employment 
action”;47 and finally, that there was a causal connection between the 
protected activity and the adverse employment action.48 If the plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case, the McDonnell Douglas49 burden-shifting 
framework will be applied. Under this framework, if the employer 
                                                     
39. See id. (emphasis added). 
40. See discussion infra Part VI.A. 
41. See discussion infra Part VI. 
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Although the statute does not include any language that would 
indicate that a reasonable belief that the employer has committed an unlawful employment practice 
is sufficient, courts both before and after Breeden have interpreted the statute in that manner. See 
Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 1129 n.7, 1133 n.28. 
43. See LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 2, at 99–101. 
44. See supra note 4. 
45. See Riddell & Bales, supra note 12, at 315. 
46. Id. This is the element of the prima facie case where the dispute about the level of protection 
afforded by the opposition clause and/or the participation clause becomes relevant. 
47. Id. Prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. 
White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), the United States courts of appeals had established different standards 
for determining what constitutes an “adverse employment action.” For a complete discussion of the 
various approaches the courts took with respect to what constituted an “adverse employment action” 
prior to Burlington Northern, see Riddell & Bales, supra note 12, at 315–30. In Burlington 
Northern, the Court ultimately adopted a somewhat employee-friendly approach, concluding that to 
establish an “adverse employment action,” a plaintiff must “show that a reasonable employee would 
have found the challenged action materially adverse, which . . . means it well might have dissuaded 
a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” 548 U.S. at 68 (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
48. Riddell & Bales, supra note 12, at 315. 
49. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
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articulates a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, the 
employee then has the burden of proving that the employer’s articulated 
reason was pretextual, and that the real reason for the adverse 
employment action was retaliation.50 
With respect to the first element, engaging in protected activity, 
courts have typically provided more protection to plaintiffs suing under 
the participation clause. Specifically, while many courts protected 
almost all participation-clause activity pre-Breeden,51 courts analyzing 
opposition-clause cases tried to balance the employee’s right to oppose 
what he reasonably believed was an unlawful employment practice with 
the employer’s right to control its employees and employment policies.52 
When addressing opposition-clause claims, courts often had to decide 
whether the employee’s belief that the employer engaged in an unlawful 
employment practice was reasonable and whether the employee’s form 
of opposition was reasonable.53 
Regardless of under which clause the plaintiff seeks protection, the 
courts are unanimous that a plaintiff need not win his discrimination 
claim in order to win his retaliation claim;54 the standard needed to 
prevail now depends on whether the retaliation claim was based on 
participation or opposition and upon the jurisdiction in which the 
plaintiff files suit.55 One caveat is that the employment practice about 
which the plaintiff complains must be a practice covered by Title VII.56 
                                                     
50. For a thorough explanation of the burden-shifting approach taken by courts when confronted 
with employment discrimination claims, see McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–07. See also 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 
509 U.S. 502, 506–12 (1993); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–60 
(1981). 
51. See, e.g., Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir. 2000); Wyatt v. City of 
Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing cases); Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 
879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989). 
52. See, e.g., Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1142 (5th Cir. 
1981) (determining that an employee’s picketing and boycotting were protected activities). 
53. See id. at 1140–41. 
54. See LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 2, at 97–99. But see EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 
398 F. Supp. 300, 306 (M.D. Ga. 1975) (requiring an actual Title VII violation for the plaintiff to be 
protected under the anti-retaliation provision). 
55. See LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 2, at 100–03. Courts have determined that the plaintiff 
need not win the claim despite the fact that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision limits protection to 
individuals who oppose a practice “made an unlawful employment practice” under Title VII. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). For a thorough discussion of this issue, see generally Rosenthal, supra 
note 15. 
56. See Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 268 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1207 
(2006) (deciding that a plaintiff’s “vague allegations” of “‘civil rights’ violations” were not 
protected activity). See also infra note 58. 
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Specifically, the plaintiff would fail in a Title VII retaliation claim if he 
filed an EEOC charge and failed to identify a protected characteristic as 
the motivating factor behind the adverse employment action.57 For 
example, an employee would fail in a Title VII retaliation claim if his 
complaint alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act rather than 
of Title VII.58 
As previously indicated, pre-Breeden, most federal courts protected 
almost all participation activities.59 However, regarding opposition 
activities, courts were split with respect to whether an employee’s belief 
of an employer’s unlawful employment practice had to be reasonable, or 
whether the employee’s opposition was protected as long as he had a 
good-faith belief that the employer’s practice was unlawful.60 Although 
that issue was not before the Breeden Court, the Breeden dicta ended 
that debate, with courts now requiring that the employee’s belief of an 
unlawful employment practice be objectively reasonable.61 
Despite the facts that Breeden did not conclude that the objectively 
reasonable requirement was a part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case,62 
and that Breeden involved the opposition clause,63 some federal courts 
are now using Breeden to make it more difficult for participation-clause 
plaintiffs to prevail in their retaliation claims.64 Specifically, these courts 
                                                     
57. See Slagle, 435 F.3d at 267–68. 
58. See Learned v. City of Bellevue, 860 F.2d 928, 932–33 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming summary 
judgment against an employee who alleged a Title VII retaliation claim because the plaintiff did not 
allege discrimination involving race, color, national origin, sex, or religion); Williams v. Gonzales, 
No. 1:04CV00342, 2005 WL 3447885, at *14 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2005) (deciding that a plaintiff’s 
Title VII retaliation claim was not meritorious because the underlying conduct about which he 
complained (an issue involving overtime pay) was not within Title VII’s purview). 
59. See LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 2, at 97. 
60. For example, prior to Breeden, the Tenth Circuit required that the plaintiff have only a 
subjective, good-faith belief that the employer engaged in an unlawful employment practice. See 
Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 385 (10th Cir. 1984). Other courts, however, required 
that the plaintiff’s belief not only be a good-faith belief, but that it must also be objectively 
reasonable. See Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 
2000); Little v. United Techs., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997). 
61. See Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 1129 n.7. 
62. See Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001). 
63. See id. As indicated earlier, the second part of the Breeden opinion included a discussion of 
Title VII’s participation clause; however, because the discussion did not address the “protected 
activity” aspect of a plaintiff’s prima facie case, that section of the opinion is not directly applicable 
to the topic of this Article. See id. at 271–73. 
64. See, e.g., Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006); Gilooly v. Mo. 
Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 421 F.3d 734, 742 (8th Cir. 2005) (Colloton, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 891–92 (7th Cir. 2004); Neely v. 
City of Broken Arrow, No. 4:0700018, 2007 WL 1574762, at *2 (N.D. Okla. May 29, 2007); 
Disilverio v. Serv. Master Prof’l, No. 2:05CV01368, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24732 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 
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are applying the same reasonable-belief standard from Breeden to 
participation-clause cases.65 As a result, participation-clause plaintiffs 
now have a more difficult burden when attempting to establish their 
prima facie case. However, before addressing the pre-Breeden and post-
Breeden participation-clause cases, it is important to see how the courts 
handled opposition-clause cases prior to Breeden. 
II. BREEDEN’S EFFECT ON HOW TO TREAT OPPOSITION-
CLAUSE CASES 
Although Breeden never specifically held that an opposition-clause 
plaintiff’s good-faith belief that an employer was engaging in an 
unlawful employment practice must also be objectively reasonable, 
courts since Breeden have followed that approach.66 However, pre-
Breeden, there was a split on this issue, with some courts requiring only 
a subjective, good-faith belief that the employer’s conduct was 
unlawful.67 Although many courts required the plaintiff’s belief to be 
objectively reasonable, the Tenth Circuit was one court that required 
only the subjective, good-faith belief of unlawful employment 
practices.68 
Prior to Breeden, the Tenth Circuit required only a subjective, good-
faith belief of an unlawful employment practice.69 In Love v. RE/MAX of 
America, the court affirmed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on her 
retaliation claim.70 Even though the plaintiff’s discrimination claim 
                                                     
31, 2007); Moore v. Principi, No. 1:00CV02975, 2003 WL 21281765, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 2003). 
See also discussion infra Parts V.A and V.B. 
65. See discussion infra Parts V.A and V.B. 
66. See Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 1129 n.7. 
67. Two cases in which the court required only the plaintiff’s subjective, good-faith belief that the 
conduct was unlawful are Love v. RE/MAX of America., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 385 (10th Cir. 1984), 
and Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312–13 (6th Cir. 1989). In early 
cases involving the interpretation of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, some courts applied a 
standard stricter than the objective/subjective standard, holding that the opposition clause only 
protects employees who oppose actual unlawful employment practices. See, e.g., EEOC v. C & D 
Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 305–06 (M.D. Ga. 1975). 
68. See Love, 738 F.2d at 385. In addition to the Tenth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit also decided that 
only a subjective, good-faith belief that the activity was unlawful was required. See Booker, 879 
F.2d at 1312–13. Other courts, such as the First Circuit, Seventh Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit 
required both the subjective, good-faith belief of an unlawful employment practice and that the 
belief be objectively reasonable. See Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 
F.3d 701, 706–07 (7th Cir. 2000); Little v. United Techs., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997); 
Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994). 
69. See Love, 738 F.2d at 385. 
70. Id. at 387. 
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failed, the Tenth Circuit noted that her retaliation claim could survive as 
long as it was “based on a mistaken good faith belief that Title VII ha[d] 
been violated.”71 The court “agree[d] that a good faith belief is 
sufficient” for a plaintiff who loses her substantive claim to prevail on 
his retaliation claim.72 Even after Breeden, the Tenth Circuit and one 
district court within that circuit utilized only the subjective, good-faith-
belief test when determining whether activity was protected under Title 
VII’s opposition clause.73 Specifically, in Petersen v. Utah Department 
of Corrections, the court cited Love for the proposition that a subjective, 
good-faith belief was enough to establish protected activity.74 
Additionally, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas 
applied the subjective, good-faith-belief test in Kennedy v. General 
Motors Corp., which it decided one year after Breeden.75 In Kennedy, 
the plaintiff brought several claims, including a retaliation claim.76 In its 
motion for summary judgment, the employer claimed that the plaintiff 
did not engage in protected activity.77 Rejecting the employer’s position 
and its reliance on Breeden, the court noted: 
The Breeden decision, then, is somewhat curious in that the 
Court seems to have held the plaintiff to the more stringent 
“reasonable belief” test, concluded that the plaintiff’s claim 
failed under the more stringent test, but declined to determine 
whether that test was the appropriate standard. The court, then, 
cannot say with any degree of certainty what the import of the 
Breeden decision is, including whether the Supreme Court really 
meant to imply that as a matter of law the plaintiff could not 
have actually believed that her supervisor’s conduct violated 
Title VII. The point, however, is largely irrelevant as the Tenth 
                                                     
71. Id. at 385. In Love, the Tenth Circuit cited the following opinions for the proposition that all 
that was required was a good-faith belief: Rucker v. Higher Education Aids Board, 669 F.2d 1179, 
1182 (7th Cir. 1982); Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Construction Co., 655 F.2d 146, 150 (8th Cir. 1981); 
Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1137–40 (5th Cir. 1981); Parker 
v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Monteiro v. Poole Silver 
Co., 615 F.2d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1980); Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 
1978); Mitchell v. Visser, 529 F. Supp. 1034, 1043 (D. Kan. 1981). 
72. Love, 738 F.2d at 385. 
73. See Petersen v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 301 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002); Kennedy v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 226 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1264 (D. Kan. 2002). 
74. 301 F.3d at 1188. 
75. Kennedy, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 1258–59. 
76. Id. The other claims the plaintiff brought against the defendant included additional Title VII 
claims and a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Id. 
77. Id. at 1263. 
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Circuit—in a decision that was issued after the Supreme Court’s 
Breeden decision—recently restated its adherence to the 
subjective standard without mention of the Breeden decision. To 
the extent that there is any discrepancy between Breeden [sic] 
and Petersen, that is a matter to be clarified by the Circuit and 
not this court in light of the Circuit’s unequivocal statement of 
the standard in Petersen.78 
Thus, the court refused to adopt the objectively reasonable standard as 
part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.79 
Although the court in Kennedy was hesitant to use Breeden and adopt 
the objectively reasonable standard, the Tenth Circuit eventually adopted 
Breeden’s objectively reasonable standard when it decided Crumpacker 
v. Kansas.80 In Crumpacker, the plaintiff brought suit, alleging sex 
discrimination and retaliation.81 The court eventually confronted the 
issue of whether a subjective, good-faith belief that the practice at issue 
was unlawful was sufficient to constitute protected activity.82 After 
acknowledging that recent precedent would allow for the plaintiff’s 
suggested good-faith-only interpretation,83 the court held that it was 
going to follow Breeden’s objectively reasonable standard: 
While the [Breeden] Court did not address the propriety of the 
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the Title VII retaliation 
provision, the Court did implicitly reject any interpretation of 
Title VII which would permit a plaintiff to maintain a retaliation 
claim based on an unreasonable good-faith belief that the 
underlying conduct violated Title VII. Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in [Breeden] supercedes [sic] and 
overrules this court’s prior decisions, to the extent they 
interpreted Title VII as permitting retaliation claims based on an 
unreasonable good-faith belief that the underlying conduct 
violated Title VII.84 
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit adopted the objectively reasonable 
requirement under the first prong of a plaintiff’s prima facie case under 
the opposition clause.85 And, as was noted earlier, after Breeden, courts 
                                                     
78. Id. at 1264 (citation omitted). 
79. Id. 
80. 338 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2003). 
81. Id. at 1165. 
82. Id. at 1171. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
85. Id. The Tenth Circuit was then consistent with the other United States courts of appeals that 
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from all jurisdictions have come to apply the objectively reasonable 
standard to opposition-clause cases.86 This was a departure from the 
jurisdictions that required only a subjective, good-faith belief of an 
unlawful employment practice, and this change made it much more 
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in these opposition-clause cases. 
III. THE PRE-BREEDEN ANALYSIS FOR PARTICIPATION-
CLAUSE CASES 
Pre-Breeden, most courts agreed that regardless of the content of an 
EEOC charge or the extent or nature of an employee’s participation in an 
EEOC proceeding, an employee was protected from retaliation under 
Title VII’s participation clause.87 Most courts distinguished between 
opposition-clause cases and participation-clause cases, providing 
unqualified protection for participation-clause plaintiffs and slightly 
limited protection to opposition-clause plaintiffs.88 This section of the 
Article will examine how the majority of courts analyzed participation-
clause cases prior to Breeden. 
Prior to Breeden, most federal courts provided almost unlimited 
protection to individuals suing under the participation clause.89 Unlike 
opposition-clause cases, many of which involved an inquiry into whether 
the plaintiff’s belief of unlawful employment practices and the plaintiff’s 
form of opposition were reasonable, most participation-clause cases 
simply asked whether the plaintiff participated in the EEOC process.90 If 
the plaintiff did participate in a Title VII action, that activity was 
protected, regardless of whether the conduct was reasonable, and 
regardless of the plaintiff’s motives.91 Three pre-Breeden cases that 
stand for this proposition come from the First Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, 
                                                     
have addressed this issue. 
86. See Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 1128 n.7. 
87. See LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 2, at § 2.40. 
88. Id. 
89. Id.; see also Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994); Booker v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Co., Inc., 879 F.2d 1305, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989); Sias v. City Demonstration 
Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1007 
(5th Cir. 1969). 
90. Butts v. McCullough, 237 F. App’x 1, 5 (6th Cir. 2007); Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 
F.3d 262, 266 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1207 (2006). Although the two previously cited cases 
were decided after Breeden, several pre-Breeden cases made the same observation. See, e.g., 
Booker, 879 F.2d at 1312. 
91. See LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 2, at § 2.40; Butts, 237 F. App’x at 5; Booker, 879 F.2d at 
1312. 
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and the Fifth Circuit.92 In all three cases, the courts indicated that the 
plaintiff receives almost unqualified protection for participation-clause 
activities.93 
The First Circuit addressed this issue in Wyatt v. City of Boston.94 In 
Wyatt, the plaintiff was a teacher who brought multiple claims against 
the Boston Public School System.95 In one claim, the plaintiff alleged 
that his former employer retaliated against him as a result of his filing of 
a charge with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination 
and as a result of his opposition to what he perceived to be sexual 
harassment.96 The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, and the 
plaintiff appealed.97 In reversing the dismissal, the First Circuit 
addressed the need for determining whether the plaintiff’s actions fell 
under the opposition clause or the participation clause.98 The court noted 
that while a plaintiff pursuing a claim under the opposition clause must 
have a reasonable belief that the employer’s conduct violated Title VII, 
“there is nothing in [the participation clause’s] wording requiring that 
the charges be valid, nor even an implied requirement that they be 
reasonable.”99 The court then observed that it was “well settled” that the 
participation clause protects plaintiffs regardless of the merits of their 
claims, and that the protection extends to statements that are false and 
malicious.100 
The Sixth Circuit also took a broad approach to the participation 
clause’s protection prior to Breeden. In Booker v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Co.,101 although the court was analyzing a claim brought under 
                                                     
92. Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 15; Booker, 879 F.2d at 1312; Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1007. The Fourth 
Circuit had also given a broad interpretation to the participation clause prior to Breeden. See Glover 
v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999). In fact, the Fourth Circuit still 
provides a high level of protection for employees pursuing claims under that clause of Title VII’s 
anti-retaliation provision. See Martin v. Mecklenburg County, 151 F. App’x 275, 279 (4th Cir. 
2005) (acknowledging the broad protection afforded by the participation clause, but expressing 
concern regarding whether lies should be protected). 
93. Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 15; Booker, 879 F.2d at 1312; Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1007. 
94. 35 F.3d at 13. 
95. Id. at 14. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 15. 
99. Id. (quoting 3 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
§ 87.12(b), at 17–95 (1994)) (emphasis added). 
100. Id. (citing Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978); Pettway v. 
Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1007 (5th Cir. 1969)). 
101. 879 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1989). 
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Michigan’s anti-discrimination statute, the court made clear that Title 
VII provided greater protection to participation-clause plaintiffs than to 
opposition-clause plaintiffs.102 In Booker, the Sixth Circuit applied Title 
VII case law to determine the extent of protection afforded by the state 
statute.103 When addressing the participation clause’s protections, the 
court noted: 
The distinction between employee activities protected by the 
participation clause and those protected by the opposition clause 
is significant because federal courts have generally granted less 
protection for opposition than for participation in enforcement 
proceedings. The “exceptionally broad protection” of the 
participation clause extends to persons who have “participated in 
any manner” in Title VII proceedings. Protection is not lost if 
the employee is wrong on the merits of the charge, nor is 
protection lost if the contents of the charge are malicious and 
defamatory as well as wrong. Thus, once the activity in question 
is found to be within the scope of the participation clause, the 
employee is generally protected from retaliation.104 
After describing this “exceptionally broad protection” for participation-
clause plaintiffs, the court noted that the opposition clause does not 
afford such broad protection.105 Therefore, it was clear that prior to 
Breeden, the Sixth Circuit provided “exceptionally broad protection” to 
participation-clause plaintiffs.106 
One final example of how, prior to Breeden, courts provided very 
broad protection to participation-clause plaintiffs comes from the Fifth 
Circuit.107 In fact, both Wyatt and Booker relied on Pettway v. American 
Cast Iron Pipe Co., despite the fact that Pettway was decided twenty 
years prior to Booker and twenty-five years prior to Wyatt.108 In Pettway, 
the Fifth Circuit addressed the scope of protection afforded by Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation provision.109 The employer argued that the plaintiff 
made false and malicious accusations in an EEOC correspondence, and 
that such communications could form the basis for a lawful 
                                                     
102. Id. at 1312. The plaintiff was pursuing a claim under the Michigan Civil Rights Act. The 
plaintiff also brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006 (5th Cir. 1969). 
108. Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 1994); Booker, 879 F.2d at 1312. 
109. 411 F.2d at 999–1000. 
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termination.110 The plaintiff, however, argued that the participation 
clause protected all statements, regardless of their truth and of the 
plaintiff’s motive.111 
The trial court determined that an employer could lawfully terminate 
an employee under such circumstances, but the Fifth Circuit reversed.112 
The Fifth Circuit noted that 
Title VII also specifically protects assistance and participation. 
This indicates the exceptionally broad protection intended for 
protestors of discriminatory employment practices. The 
protection of assistance and participation in any manner would 
be illusory if [an] employer could retaliate against [an] 
employee for having assisted or participated in a Commission 
proceeding.113 
The court then continued: 
We hold that where, disregarding the malicious material 
contained in a charge (or petition for reconsideration, or other 
communication with EEOC sufficient for EEOC purposes, or in 
a proceeding before EEOC) the charge otherwise satisfies the 
liberal requirements of a charge, the charging party is exercising 
a protected right under the Act. He may not be discharged for 
such writing. The employer may not take it upon itself to 
determine the correctness or consequences of it. Nor may the 
court either sustain any employer disciplinary action or deny 
relief because of the presence of such malicious material . . . . 
An employer, consistent with the language and the intent of 
Title VII, simply cannot avail himself of the retributive 
discharge as a means of stifling minority group complaints to the 
EEOC.114 
Therefore, the court gave the participation clause a very broad 
interpretation. However, in a footnote, the court noted that an employer 
could pursue a civil claim for defamation against the individual who 
made the allegedly defamatory comments.115 
As this section of the Article has demonstrated, prior to Breeden, 
several United States courts of appeals determined that Title VII’s 
                                                     
110. Id. at 1003. 
111. Id. at 1003–04. 
112. Id. at 1004, 1008. 
113. Id. at 1006 n.18 (emphasis added). 
114. Id. at 1007 & n.22. 
115. Id. at 1007 n.22. 
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participation clause provided more protection to plaintiffs than did Title 
VII’s opposition clause, and that this protection was extremely broad.116 
However, as will be demonstrated later in this Article, after the Court 
issued its Breeden opinion, some courts started to give a more limited 
interpretation to that clause.117 As a result, participation-clause plaintiffs 
in some jurisdictions now face a more difficult burden when trying to 
pursue a claim under that provision. However, before this Article 
addresses the ramifications of Breeden, it will address the Breeden 
opinion itself. 
IV. THE BREEDEN OPINION 
Although the Supreme Court in Breeden did not hold that plaintiffs in 
opposition-clause cases must prove that they had an objectively 
reasonable belief that their employer was engaged in an unlawful 
employment practice, courts have come to interpret Breeden as standing 
for that proposition.118 In Breeden, the plaintiff alleged that while she 
and two male employees were reviewing job applicants, the plaintiff’s 
supervisor repeated a sexually explicit comment that was contained in 
one of the evaluations.119 He then turned to the plaintiff and said that he 
did not understand the comment.120 Next, the other male employee 
indicated that he would explain the comment later, and both men 
laughed.121 The plaintiff complained to the supervisor who made the 
statement, as well as to other individuals.122 However, the plaintiff 
acknowledged that she was not offended by the comment when she read 
it; so it appears that it was the supervisor’s reading of the comment, his 
statement that he did not understand it, and the subsequent discussion 
between the two male co-workers that formed the basis of the plaintiff’s 
complaint.123 
The district court granted the employer’s motion for summary 
                                                     
116. As was noted supra note 92, the Fourth Circuit had also granted broad protection to 
participation-clause plaintiffs prior to Breeden. 
117. See discussion infra Parts V.A and V.B. 
118. See Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 1139–42. 
119. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 269 (2001). 
120. Id. Specifically, the comment was that “making love to [her] was like making love to the 
Grand Canyon.” Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 269–70. 
123. Id. at 271. 
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judgment, but the Ninth Circuit reversed.124 The Ninth Circuit noted that 
the opposition clause extends not only to conduct that is unlawful, but 
also to complaints about conduct that the employee could reasonably 
believe was unlawful.125 Reasoning that the plaintiff’s opposition would 
have been protected if she had a reasonable, good-faith belief that the 
incident constituted sexual harassment, the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
grant of summary judgment.126  
On certiorari, the Court declined to decide whether the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the opposition clause was correct, believing that even if 
the Ninth Circuit’s standard was correct, “no one could reasonably 
believe that the incident [involved in this case] violated Title VII.”127 
Explaining that no reasonable person could have concluded that the 
incident could have reached the level of actionable sexual harassment, 
the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that summary judgment 
was inappropriate.128 According to the Court, “[the plaintiff’s] 
supervisor’s comment, made at a meeting to review the application, that 
he did not know what the statement meant; [the plaintiff’s] co-worker’s 
responding comment; and the chuckling of both are at worst an ‘isolated 
inciden[t]’ that cannot remotely be considered ‘extremely serious,’ as 
our cases require.”129 
Although the Court did not hold that plaintiffs suing under Title VII’s 
anti-retaliation provision’s opposition clause must prove that they had a 
reasonable and good-faith belief of an unlawful employment practice,130 
all courts since Breeden have come to read Breeden as imposing this 
requirement.131 As the next section illustrates, some courts are now 
applying that standard to participation-clause cases, despite the facts that 
Breeden did not involve the participation clause and that Breeden did not 
even definitively establish that standard for opposition-clause cases. 
 
                                                     
124. Id. at 269. The unpublished opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit can be found at Breeden v. Clark County School District, No. 99-15522, 2000 WL 991821 
(9th Cir. July 19, 2000). 
125. Breeden, 2000 WL 991821, at *1. 
126. Id. at *1–2. 
127. Breeden, 532 U.S. at 270. 
128. Id. at 270–71. 
129. Id. at 271 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)). 
130. Id. at 270. 
131. See Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 1129 n.7. 
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V. BREEDEN’S EFFECT ON PARTICIPATION-CLAUSE CASES 
Since Breeden, some federal courts have read too much into the 
opinion and have applied it to participation-clause cases.132 This has 
happened even though Breeden did not address participation-clause 
cases and the Court did not even specifically adopt the good-faith, 
objectively reasonable standard in opposition-clause cases.133 However, 
believing that there is no reason to treat these types of claims differently, 
these courts have made it more difficult for participation-clause 
plaintiffs to bring successful actions, and in the process, they have most 
likely chilled employees’ participation activities.  
A. United States Courts of Appeals That Have Applied Breeden to 
Participation-Clause Cases 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is one 
court that has interpreted Breeden to apply to participation-clause cases, 
and several courts have followed its pro-employer decision in Mattson v. 
Caterpillar, Inc.134 In Mattson, the court determined that the plaintiff’s 
discrimination charge was without merit, unreasonable, and made in bad 
faith; as a result, the court determined the participation clause did not 
protect the plaintiff.135 In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected or 
distinguished other courts’ opinions that had held that all participation 
activities are protected.136 The court also relied on Breeden for this 
                                                     
132. See discussion infra Parts V.A and V.B. These cases include Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 
461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006); Gilooly v. Missouri Department of Health & Senior Services, 421 
F.3d 734, 742 (8th Cir. 2005) (Colloton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Mattson v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 892 (7th Cir. 2004); Neely v. City of Broken Arrow, No. 
4:07CV00018, 2007 WL 1574762 at *6 (N.D. Okla. May 29, 2007); Disilviero v. Service Master 
Professional, No. 2:05CV01368, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24732 at *12 (W.D. Pa. March 31, 2007); 
and Moore v. Principi, No. 1:00CV02975, 2003 WL 21281765, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 2003). 
133. Breeden, 532 U.S. at 270. Later in the Breeden opinion, the Court did address a 
participation-clause issue, id. at 271–74; however, that part of the opinion is not relevant to the 
specific issue involved in this Article. 
134. 359 F.3d at 885 (7th Cir. 2004). Some courts have also cited Mattson for the proposition that 
the objectively reasonable standard applies to opposition-clause cases. See Rabago v. Univ. of Tex. 
Med. Branch, No. G-04-141, 2005 WL 3078653, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2005). Of course, most 
courts that apply the objectively reasonable standard to opposition-clause cases cite Breeden for that 
proposition. 
135. 359 F.3d at 890–91. 
136. Id. at 889–90 (rejecting the plaintiff’s attempt to use Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 
215 F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir. 2000); Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 
1312 (6th Cir. 1989); Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1298 (8th Cir. 1980); and Pettway v. 
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1007 (5th Cir. 1969)). 
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conclusion.137 
In Mattson, the plaintiff complained to a supervisor when a female 
employee touched him on two occasions.138 After concluding that the 
complaint lacked merit, the employer warned the plaintiff that making 
false accusations of harassment could lead to disciplinary action.139 
Three months later, the plaintiff filed formal charges based upon the 
same allegations of inappropriate touching.140 After this, the employer 
discovered that the plaintiff’s purpose for filing these charges was to 
have his supervisor terminated.141 As a result, the employer terminated 
the plaintiff.142 The plaintiff then brought a retaliation lawsuit, and the 
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer.143 
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that despite the possibility that his 
charge was filed in bad faith, his actions, while not protected under the 
opposition clause, were still protected under the participation clause.144 
The plaintiff argued that he did not lose Title VII protection simply 
because his allegations were either unreasonable or made in bad faith.145 
Rejecting or distinguishing the cases upon which the plaintiff relied, the 
Seventh Circuit noted that “this Court has consistently stated that utterly 
baseless claims do not receive protection under Title VII.”146 Believing 
that allowing such claims would “arm employees with a tactical coercive 
weapon”147 to maintain job security, the court decided that protection 
should not be afforded to those who file baseless claims: 
                                                     
137. Id. 






144. Id. at 889–90. 
145. Id. The plaintiff in Mattson relied on Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 582 
(6th Cir. 2000); Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989); 
Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1298 (8th Cir. 1980); and Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe 
Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1007 (5th Cir. 1969). 
146. Mattson, 359 F.3d at 890 (citing Fine v. Ryan Int’l Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 
2002); McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1996); Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 
28 F.3d 1446, 1458 (7th Cir. 1994)). Although these cases do stand for this proposition, Fine and 
Dey both involved Title VII’s opposition clause, not its participation clause. Fine, 305 F.3d at 751–
52; Dey, 28 F.3d at 1458. The Cisneros case, which relied on Dey for this “utterly baseless” 
proposition, involved both formal and informal complaints, and it was unclear under which clause 
of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision the plaintiffs were proceeding. 84 F.3d at 258–59. 
147. Mattson, 359 F.3d at 890–91 (quoting Spadola v. New York City Transit Auth., 242 F. 
Supp. 2d 284, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
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We believe that the same threshold standard should apply to 
both opposition and participation clause cases. That is, the 
claims must not be utterly baseless. Were we to adopt a different 
standard, an employee could immunize his unreasonable and 
malicious internal complaints simply by filing a discrimination 
complaint with a government agency. Similarly, an employee 
could assure himself unlimited tenure by filing continuous 
complaints with the government agency if he fears that his 
employer will discover his duplicitous behavior at the 
workplace.148 
The court then claimed that its position was consistent with cases from 
the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, yet it also acknowledged that neither of 
those circuits answered the question regarding which standard applied to 
participation-clause cases.149 
The Seventh Circuit then addressed Breeden.150 After describing 
Breeden, the court addressed the plaintiff’s argument that Breeden was 
inapplicable to participation-clause cases.151 In response to the plaintiff’s 
argument, the Seventh Circuit curiously noted: 
While we acknowledge that the Supreme Court did not apply the 
reasonableness requirement in a participation clause context, the 
Supreme Court also did not hold that the reasonableness 
requirement only applies to the opposition clause. Because the 
Supreme Court did not distinguish between opposition and 
participation claims, we also decline to do so and hold that the 
good faith, reasonableness requirement applies to all Title VII 
claims.152 
                                                     
148. Mattson, 359 F.3d at 891. 
149. Id. The two cases with which the Seventh Circuit claimed its opinion was consistent were 
Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir. 2000), and Wideman v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1455 (11th Cir. 1998). Interestingly, however, although the Eleventh 
Circuit in Wideman did note that it had not answered the specific question (nor was it going to do so 
in that opinion), the Sixth Circuit in Johnson seemed to suggest that it had adopted a more liberal 
reading of Title VII’s participation clause than the Seventh Circuit was claiming; in fact, many 
courts have relied on Johnson for the idea that the participation clause provides more protection 
than the opposition clause. See, e.g., Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 268 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 547 U.S. 1207 (2006). 
150. Mattson, 359 F.3d at 891–92. 
151. Id. at 892. 
152. Id. (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning that because the Supreme Court did 
not limit its Breeden holding to opposition-clause cases, it must have meant that it applied to all 
retaliation cases, is flawed. As was mentioned previously, prior to Breeden, most courts treated the 
two provisions differently; the language of the two provisions is different, and simply because the 
Court did not limit its opinion to cases brought pursuant to the opposition clause does not mean the 
Court intended to treat them similarly—the Court was faced with only the opposition clause, and it 
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Therefore, the Seventh Circuit became one court to extend Breeden to 
participation-clause cases, even though that particular issue was not 
before the Court in Breeden. Since Mattson, other United States courts 
of appeals have applied Breeden to participation-clause cases, despite 
the fact that most courts did not impose the objectively reasonable 
requirement on participation-clause plaintiffs prior to Breeden.153 
In addition to the Seventh Circuit, the Third Circuit has also 
concluded that Breeden’s objectively reasonable standard applies to 
participation-clause plaintiffs.154 The Third Circuit reached this 
conclusion even though (1) Breeden was an opposition-clause case,155 
(2) Breeden never established the test for determining what constitutes 
protected activity under the opposition clause or the participation 
clause,156 and (3) prior to Breeden, the majority of courts had 
consistently provided more protection to participation-clause plaintiffs 
than to opposition-clause plaintiffs.157 Nonetheless, plaintiffs in this 
circuit now face a much more difficult burden when bringing suit under 
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision’s participation clause. 
In Moore v. City of Philadelphia, several plaintiffs brought retaliation 
claims against the City of Philadelphia, alleging that the city retaliated 
against them for opposing the way some of their African-American co-
workers were treated.158 Although the plaintiffs were able to reverse the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment, the Third Circuit addressed 
the standard required for both opposition-clause plaintiffs and 
participation-clause plaintiffs to establish that they engaged in protected 
activity.159 When the court addressed the rules for analyzing retaliation 
claims, it indicated that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision did have 
                                                     
had no reason to even address the participation clause. This issue is addressed more thoroughly 
infra Part VI.D. 
153. Since Mattson, the following opinions have applied Breeden to participation-clause cases: 
Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006); Gilooly v. Missouri Department of 
Health & Senior Services, 421 F.3d 734, 744 (8th Cir. 2005) (Colloton, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Neely v. City of Broken Arrow, Case No. 4:07CV00018, 2007 WL 1574762, at 
*2 (N.D. Okla. May 29, 2007); Disilviero v. Service Master Professional, No. 2:05CV01368, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24732, at *12 (W.D. Pa. March 31, 2007). 
154. Moore, 461 F.3d at 341. As will be discussed later in this Article, a different panel of the 
Third Circuit maintained the distinction between opposition-clause cases and participation-clause 
cases. See infra Part V.C; Slagle, 435 F.3d at 266. 
155. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001). 
156. Id. 
157. See LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 2, at § 2.40. 
158. Moore, 461 F.3d at 334. 
159. Id. at 341. 
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two separate clauses, but it then relied on Breeden and observed that 
“[w]hether the employee opposes, or participates in a proceeding 
against, the employer’s activity, the employee must hold an objectively 
reasonable belief, in good faith, that the activity they [sic] oppose is 
unlawful under Title VII.”160 Although Moore relied on Breeden for this 
proposition, there is no such language in Breeden, as Breeden involved 
the opposition clause and the Court declined to determine what standard 
was appropriate in opposition-clause cases.161 Nonetheless, the Third 
Circuit did impose this higher standard for participation-clause 
plaintiffs.162 
Another opinion that referenced both Breeden and Mattson and 
argued for a lower level of protection for participation-clause plaintiffs 
was a concurring opinion from the Eighth Circuit.163 In Gilooly v. 
Missouri Department of Health & Senior Services, the plaintiff alleged 
several causes of action, including a retaliation claim based on his 
participation and allegedly false statements he made during the 
investigation of his sexual harassment claim.164 The majority reversed 
the lower court’s grant of summary judgment with regard to the 
retaliation claim, believing there was an unresolved issue of material 
fact.165 Without citing Breeden, the majority opined that employees 
cannot gain protection under Title VII after filing false charges, lying to 
investigators, or making defamatory statements.166 Nonetheless, the 
court found that an issue of fact existed regarding the cause of the 
plaintiff’s adverse action.167 
Judge Colloton wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in 
part, in which he addressed the scope of the participation clause’s 
protection post-Breeden.168 He agreed that false statements made during 
an investigation can form the basis of a lawful termination,169 and he 
                                                     
160. Id. (citing Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271) (emphasis added). 
161. 532 U.S. at 270. 
162. Moore, 461 F.3d at 341. 
163. Gilooly v. Mo. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 421 F.3d 734, 742 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(Colloton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
164. Id. at 737. 
165. Id. at 741. 
166. Id. at 740. 
167. Id. at 740–41. 
168. In his opinion, Judge Colloton opined that the court should have affirmed the lower court’s 
grant of summary judgment on all of the plaintiff’s claims, including his retaliation claim. Id. at 
741. 
169. Id. 
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then addressed the protection afforded by the opposition clause and the 
participation clause.170 After acknowledging that the “plain language of 
the [participation] clause sweeps more broadly than the opposition 
clause”171 and that some courts have extended participation-clause 
protection to false, malicious, or even frivolous complaints,172 Judge 
Colloton argued that Mattson was the correct standard, and that the same 
level of protection should apply under both the participation clause and 
the opposition clause.173 Interestingly, while Judge Colloton relied on 
Title VII’s plain language earlier in his opinion, he ultimately rejected 
the “respectable textual argument” that the participation clause provides 
broader protection than the opposition clause.174 He agreed with Mattson 
that the level of protection should be the same under the participation 
clause and the opposition clause.175 
As this section of the Article demonstrated, some United States courts 
of appeals are applying Breeden to participation-clause cases. As a 
result, many plaintiffs are facing a steeper climb when attempting to 
vindicate their rights under Title VII’s participation clause. Additionally, 
as the next section of the Article will address, several United States 
district courts are also using Breeden to limit the protection afforded by 
the participation clause. 
B. United States District Courts That Have Applied Breeden to 
Participation-Clause Cases 
In addition to some United States courts of appeals, some United 
States district courts have also begun to apply Breeden to participation-
clause cases. However, not only have district courts from within the 
circuits that applied Breeden to participation-clause cases begun to limit 
the scope of the participation clause, but district courts within circuits 
that have not applied Breeden to participation-clause cases have also 
started to erode the participation clause’s protections. This makes it 
more difficult for participation-clause plaintiffs to prevail in their 
                                                     
170. Id. at 741–42. 
171. Id. at 742. 
172. Id. (citing Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 582 (5th Cir. 2000); Womack v. 
Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1298 & n.10 (8th Cir. 1980); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 
998, 1007 (5th Cir. 1969); Proulx v. Citibank, N.A., 659 F. Supp. 972, 977–78 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). 
173. Id. at 742–43. 
174. Id. at 742. Although not directly mentioned in the opinion, the textual argument to which 
Judge Colloton was referring was most likely based on the “participated in any manner” language in 
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision’s participation clause. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). 
175. Id. at 742–43. 
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lawsuits against their employers. 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
applied the Breeden standard to a participation-clause case in Moore v. 
Principi.176 In Moore, although the court expressed its displeasure about 
imposing a higher standard on participation-clause plaintiffs, it felt 
bound to do so because of Seventh Circuit precedent.177 The plaintiff in 
Moore filed suit, alleging discrimination based on race and retaliation.178 
After a jury found in favor of his employer, the plaintiff moved for a 
new trial.179 One basis for the motion was that the trial judge gave 
inaccurate instructions regarding the standard for protected activity 
under the participation clause.180 After initially agreeing that the 
reasonable, good-faith-belief standard was appropriate in his 
participation-clause claim, the plaintiff in Principi eventually objected to 
that instruction and asked the judge to remove the reasonable, good-
faith-belief requirement from the jury instructions.181 The court 
ultimately denied the plaintiff’s request, reasoning that the Seventh 
Circuit had already determined that the reasonable, good-faith 
requirement did apply.182 The court relied on dicta from earlier Seventh 
Circuit opinions and concluded that it was bound to utilize the 
                                                     
176. No. 1:00CV02975, 2003 WL 21281765 (N.D. Ill. June 9, 2003). 
177. Id. at *38. Specifically, the court felt bound to follow the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in 
McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1996), in which that court noted that there was a 
reasonableness and good-faith threshold in participation-clause cases. The district court also noted 
several other opinions in which the Seventh Circuit had suggested (but did not hold) that there was a 
reasonableness and good-faith requirement. These cases were the following: Fine v. Ryan 
International Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2002); Hunt-Golliday v. Metropolitan Water 
Reclamation District, 104 F.3d 1004, 1014 (7th Cir. 1997); Roth v. Lutheran General Hospital, 57 
F.3d 1446, 1459–60 (7th Cir. 1995); Dey v. Colt Construction & Development Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 
1458 (7th Cir. 1994); Holland v. Jefferson National Life Insurance Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1314 (7th 
Cir. 1989); Collins v. Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 702 (7th Cir. 1987); and Jennings v. Tinley Park 
Community Consolidated School District, 796 F.2d 962, 967 (7th Cir. 1986). Some of these cases, 
however, involved the opposition clause rather than the participation clause. See supra note 146. 
The Moore court did, however, acknowledge that there was authority for the proposition that the 
participation clause granted more protection than the opposition clause. Specifically, the court noted 
that Glover v. South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, 170 F.3d 411, 415–16 (4th Cir. 1999), 
Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994), and Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989), all provided support for the proposition that there was no 
requirement that the underlying charge be made reasonably or in good faith. 
178. Moore, 2003 WL 21281765, at *1. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at *2. The plaintiff in Moore filed an internal complaint of discrimination, which usually 
triggers Title VII’s opposition clause. Id. Nonetheless, the court in Moore treated the plaintiff’s 
actions as falling under the participation clause. Id. at *3. 
181. Id. at *2. 
182. Id. 
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reasonable, good-faith standard in participation-clause cases.183 
The court did not cite Breeden, and it also suggested that it was not 
entirely comfortable applying this higher standard: 
Were this Court dealing with the issue as an original matter, we 
would be inclined to follow those Circuits that have confronted 
the point directly and have concluded that under the statute’s 
participation clause (unlike the opposition clause), there is no 
threshold requirement that the underlying discrimination charge 
be made reasonably or in good faith and that the protection 
against retaliation is absolute.184 
Despite its concern, the court eventually saw some merit in the higher 
standard.185 The court noted that there were “valid reasons why there 
ought to be some threshold that an employee making a charge of 
discrimination must clear before becoming entitled to protection against 
retaliation.”186 Additionally, the court noted that an employee should not 
be able to “acquire indefinite tenure by peppering his employer with 
frivolous complaints . . . .”187 The court concluded that as long as the 
threshold was low, employees would not be dissuaded from filing 
charges, which is what the anti-retaliation provision was enacted to 
ensure.188 
The United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania has also applied the same standard to both opposition-
clause cases and participation-clause cases.189 In Disilverio v. Service 
Master Professional, the court granted the employer’s motion for 
summary judgment after the plaintiff alleged that his employer retaliated 
against him for not providing information relevant to another 
employee’s discrimination charge and for refusing to provide false 
                                                     
183. Id. at *3 (relying on Fine v. Ryan Int’l Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2002); Hunt-
Golliday v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist., 104 F.3d 1004, 1014 (7th Cir. 1997); Roth v. Lutheran 
Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1459–60 (7th Cir. 1995); Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 
1458 (7th Cir. 1994); Holland v. Jefferson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1314 (7th Cir. 1989); 
Collins v. Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 702 (7th Cir. 1987); Jennings v. Tinley Park Cmty. Consol. Sch. 
Dist., 796 F.2d 962, 967 (7th Cir. 1986)). As was noted earlier, however, at least some of these 
cases involved the opposition clause rather than the participation clause. See supra notes 146 and 
177 and accompanying text. 
184. Moore, 2003 WL 21281765, at *3. 




189. Disilverio v. Serv. Master Prof’l, No. 2:05CV01368, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24732, at *1–2 
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2007). 
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information regarding that charge.190 The employer conceded that the 
plaintiff had engaged in protected activity and that he suffered an 
adverse employment action; therefore, the only remaining issues were 
whether there was a causal connection between the two events and 
whether the plaintiff created an issue of fact regarding the employer’s 
reason for the adverse action.191 Despite the employer’s concession 
regarding the plaintiff’s protected activity, the court elaborated on this 
element of the prima facie case.192 While acknowledging that there are 
two clauses in Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, the court echoed the 
arguments made in Moore v. City of Philadelphia, stating that a plaintiff 
must have a reasonable, good-faith belief that the conduct he is opposing 
(or participating against) was unlawful, regardless of the specific clause 
under which the plaintiff was pursuing a claim.193 The court also cited 
Breeden for this proposition.194 
Finally, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Oklahoma has also concluded that Breeden’s reasonable, good-faith-
belief standard applies to participation-clause cases.195 In Neely v. City of 
Broken Arrow, the district court responded to an employer’s motion to 
dismiss by allowing the plaintiff to amend his complaint; however, it 
was clear from the court’s opinion that it interpreted Breeden to apply to 
participation-clause cases.196 The plaintiff, a firefighter, was asked to 
investigate possible sexual harassment in his department and, according 
to the complaint, he ultimately believed that the firefighters had sexually 
harassed members of the public.197 The plaintiff alleged that as a result 
of his conclusions, he suffered an adverse action, and he later filed a 
charge alleging he was retaliated against for participating in the 
investigation.198 The plaintiff first argued that different standards applied 
to cases brought under the participation clause and the opposition 
                                                     
190. Id. 
191. Id. at *11. 
192. Id. at *11–12. 
193. Id. at *12 (citing Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
194. Id. (citing Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001)). 
195. Neely v. City of Broken Arrow, No. 4:07CV00018, 2007 WL 1574762, at *2 (N.D. Okla., 
May 29, 2007). 
196. Id. at *2. 
197. Id. Although Title VII prohibits employees from harassing other employees in the 
workplace, the statute does not prohibit individuals from harassing members of the public. See 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
198. Neely, 2007 WL 1574762, at *2. 
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clause.199 The plaintiff argued that there was no requirement that his 
belief of unlawful discrimination be objectively reasonable.200 Relying 
on Jeffries v. Kansas,201 a case decided prior to Breeden that rejected the 
objectively reasonable requirement in participation-clause cases, the 
plaintiff argued that his actions were protected.202 The plaintiff in Neely 
also argued that because Breeden involved the opposition clause, that 
opinion was applicable only to opposition-clause cases.203 Despite these 
persuasive arguments, the court disagreed.204 
In rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that Breeden applied only to 
opposition-clause cases, the court relied on the Tenth Circuit’s opinion 
in Crumpacker v. Kansas Department of Human Resources.205 
Crumpacker was an opposition-clause case that determined that after 
Breeden, an employee’s good-faith belief of an unlawful employment 
practice was not enough to immunize him from retaliation if that belief 
was not reasonable.206 As was noted earlier, pre-Breeden, the Tenth 
Circuit had required only a good-faith belief of an unlawful employment 
practice, but that court ultimately changed its position post-Breeden.207 
Interestingly, although Breeden was an opposition-clause case, the court 
in Neely extended it to the participation clause: 
The Supreme Court, however, recently rejected by implication 
any interpretation of Title VII that would permit plaintiffs to 
maintain retaliation claims based on an unreasonable good-faith 
belief that the underlying conduct violated Title VII . . . [T]he 
Supreme Court’s decision in [Breeden] supercedes [sic] and 
overrules this court’s prior decisions, to the extent they 
interpreted Title VII as permitting retaliation claims based on an 
unreasonable good-faith belief that the underlying conduct 
violation [sic] Title VII . . . Notably, the Tenth Circuit did not 
state that “retaliation opposition claims” must be based on 
                                                     
199. Id. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Jeffries v. Kansas, 
147 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 1998), controlled participation-clause cases, and that its grant of broader 
protection to participation-clause plaintiffs was still good law after Breeden. Neely, 2007 WL 
1574762, at *2. 
200. Id. 
201. 147 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 1998). 
202. Neely, 2007 WL 1574762, at *2. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. (citing Crumpacker v. Kan. Dept. of Human Res., 338 F.3d 1163, 1172 n.5 (10th Cir. 
2003)). 
206. Crumpacker, 338 F.3d at 1172. 
207. Id. at 1171. 
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reasonable, good-faith belief; it stated that “retaliation claims” in 
general are governed by Breeden.208 
Although Crumpacker and Breeden were opposition-clause cases, the 
Neely court observed that “notably, the Tenth Circuit did not state that 
‘retaliation opposition claims’ must be based on reasonable, good-faith 
belief; it stated that retaliation claims in general are governed by 
Breeden. This court reads Crumpacker to hold that Breeden added an 
objective, reasonableness inquiry into both opposition and participation 
cases.”209 Thus, Neely is another example of an opinion where a court 
applied Breeden to a participation-clause case.210 
As this section of the Article demonstrates, some United States 
district courts are applying Breeden to participation-clause cases and are 
limiting the protection afforded by that clause. However, as the next two 
sections of the Article will demonstrate, not all courts agree with this 
approach. Some courts still provide participation-clause plaintiffs with 
the protections they received from most courts prior to Breeden. 
C. United States Courts of Appeals That Have Not Applied Breeden to 
Participation-Clause Cases 
Although some United States courts of appeals have decided that 
Breeden applies to both opposition-clause cases and participation-clause 
cases, not all of these courts have agreed. In fact, several courts of 
appeals have continued to grant broader protection to plaintiffs pursuing 
claims under the participation clause without even mentioning Breeden 
in their opinions. This section of the Article will analyze some of those 
cases. 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one such opinion in Butts 
                                                     
208. Neely, 2007 WL 1574762, at *2 (quoting Crumpacker, 338 F.3d at 1171). 
209. Id. at *2. Similar to how Mattson interpreted Breeden, this is another example of a court 
reading too much into what a court does not write. The reason the court in Crumpacker did not refer 
to participation-clause cases was because that case did not involve participation-clause retaliation. 
See Crumpacker, 338 F.3d at 1166. The Neely court’s decision to infer the objectively reasonable 
requirement from Breeden and Crumpacker is yet another example of reading too much into an 
opinion that does not even address the same topic before the court. 
210. Although not specifically referencing Breeden, the United States District Court for the 
District of Hawaii also adopted the Mattson standard and applied the same level of protection to 
both opposition-clause cases and participation-clause cases. Specifically, in Funai v. Brownlee, the 
court relied on Mattson and concluded “that in order to constitute ‘protected activity,’ such 
participation must still be ‘reasonable,’ just as is required under the ‘opposition clause.’” 369 F. 
Supp. 2d 1222, 1230–31 (D. Haw. 2004) (citing Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 891 (7th 
Cir. 2004)). 
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v. McCullough.211 In Butts, the plaintiff filed suit under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act212 and the Tennessee Human Rights 
Act,213 alleging age discrimination and retaliation.214 After the jury ruled 
in the plaintiff’s favor, the defendants appealed.215 The court used Title 
VII case law to analyze the plaintiff’s retaliation claim,216 noted the 
distinction between the opposition and participation clauses, and then 
noted that the level of protection differs depending upon which clause 
the plaintiff based his claim.217 While first acknowledging that 
opposition conduct must be based on a “reasonable and good faith 
belief,” the court then observed that the protection afforded by the 
participation clause is much broader.218 The court noted that “with 
respect to the participation clause, this Court has stated that [t]he 
‘exceptionally broad protections’ of the participation clause extend[ ] to 
persons who have ‘participated in any manner’ in Title VII 
proceedings.”219 The court continued: “Protection is not lost if the 
employee is wrong on the merits of the charge, nor is protection lost if 
the contents of the charge are malicious or defamatory as well as 
wrong.”220 In conclusion, the court noted that “once [the] activity in 
question is found to be within the scope of the participation clause, the 
employee is generally protected from retaliation.”221 Therefore, the Sixth 
Circuit is one court that has not applied Breeden to participation-clause 
cases.222 
The Third Circuit also maintained the distinction between opposition-
                                                     
211. 237 F. App’x 1 (6th Cir. 2007). The Sixth Circuit is one court with a history of applying 
different standards to cases brought under the opposition clause and the participation clause. See, 
e.g., Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 579–82 (6th Cir. 2000). 
212. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34. (2000). 
213. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101 (2005). 
214. Butts, 237 F. App’x at 1. 
215. Id. at 1–2. 
216. Id. at 5 (citing Johnson, 215 F.3d at 579). The ADEA’s anti-retaliation provision is very 
similar to Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(d); Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 
115 F.3d 400, 404 n.6 (6th Cir. 1997). 
217. Butts, 237 F. App’x at 5–6. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at 6. 
220. Id. (quoting Johnson, 215 F.3d at 582). 
221. Id. 
222. Despite this conclusion that the participation clause provides greater protection than the 
opposition clause, the plaintiff in Butts still lost on appeal; however, that result was not related to 
the issue of the participation clause’s scope of protection in a post-Breeden world, but rather it 
happened because the plaintiff could not produce sufficient evidence of pretext. Id. at 8. 
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clause claims and participation-clause claims in Slagle v. County of 
Clarion;223 however, as previously discussed, the Third Circuit adopted a 
narrower interpretation of the participation clause seven months after 
Slagle in Moore v. City of Philadelphia.224 Although Moore was decided 
after Slagle, both opinions were issued post-Breeden, and while Moore 
relied on Breeden, the same court (but a different panel) in Slagle 
indicated that there were two different standards for the two different 
types of cases.225 In Slagle, the plaintiff filed a retaliation complaint, 
alleging that his employer retaliated against him on two separate 
occasions.226 The district court granted the employer’s motion for 
summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed.227 Although the Third 
Circuit affirmed the judgment, it did so because the plaintiff’s EEOC 
charge did not allege any type of Title VII violation; as such, the 
plaintiff did not engage in protected activity.228 Ultimately, the Third 
Circuit determined that the participation clause does not protect facially 
invalid claims.229 
Despite this holding, the court suggested it was not adopting Breeden 
for participation-clause cases. Specifically, the court acknowledged that 
the distinction between the opposition clause and the participation clause 
is “significant” because “the levels of statutory protection differ.”230 The 
court then noted that “[c]ourts that have interpreted the ‘participation 
clause’ have held that it offers much broader protection to Title VII 
employees than does the ‘opposition clause.’”231 Continuing to explain 
                                                     
223. 435 F.3d 262 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1207 (2006). 
224. 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006); see also supra Part V.A. 
225. Moore, 461 F.3d at 341; Slagle, 435 F.3d at 266. Two district court cases from within the 
Third Circuit appear to take the more rigorous approach and apply the objectively reasonable 
standard to participation-clause cases. In both Lloyd v. Washington & Jefferson College, No. 
2:05CV00802, 2007 WL 1575448, at *17 (W.D. Pa. May 30, 2007), and Kress v. Birchwood 
Landscaping, No. 3:05CV00566, 2007 WL 800996, at *17 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2007), the courts 
cited Breeden and noted in dicta that the same standard applies to both opposition activities and 
participation activities. 
226. Slagle, 435 F.3d at 263–64. 
227. Id. at 264. 
228. Id. at 266–67. 
229. Id. at 268. Despite this conclusion from the Third Circuit, I argue that as long as plaintiffs 
filed their charges in good faith (regardless of whether it was reasonable or unreasonable), their 
actions should be protected. See Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 1149–76. 
230. Slagle, 435 F.3d at 268 (quoting BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW 533 (2d ed. 1983)). The court also relied on Proulx v. Citibank, N.A., 659 F. 
Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), and Robinson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 
982 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1993). 
231. Id. (citing Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 2003); Booker v. Brown & 
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the participation clause’s broad protections, the court noted that the bar 
is set low in order to receive protection, and that “[o]nce a plaintiff files 
a facially valid complaint, the plaintiff will be entitled to the broad 
protections of § 704(a), as interpreted by the EEOC and by numerous 
courts.”232 Relying on the EEOC Compliance Manual, the court then 
noted that a participation-clause plaintiff is protected “regardless of 
whether the allegations in the original charge were valid or 
reasonable.”233 The court also relied on pre-Breeden cases from the First 
and Sixth Circuits.234 In conclusion, the court noted that “[a]ll that is 
required is that [a] plaintiff allege in the charge that his or her employer 
violated Title VII by discriminating against him or her on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, in any manner.”235 Because 
the plaintiff failed to do so, he was not protected.236  
As this section of the Article has demonstrated, not all United States 
courts of appeals have applied the more restrictive Breeden standard to 
participation-clause cases. Although the Third Circuit has since issued 
an opinion that seems to adopt the more rigorous standard, the Sixth 
Circuit has consistently applied different levels of protection under the 
different clauses of the anti-retaliation provision.237 As the next section 
of the Article will demonstrate, some United States district courts also 
refuse to apply Breeden to cases outside of the context in which the 
Breeden opinion was written. 
D. United States District Courts That Have Not Applied Breeden to 
Participation-Clause Cases 
In addition to the previously mentioned United States courts of 
                                                     
Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989); Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 
588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006 (5th Cir. 
1969)). 
232. Id. at 268. 
233. Id. (citing Compliance Manual, supra note 4, at § 8-II.). 
234. Id. (citing Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994); Johnson v. Univ. of 
Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir. 2000)). 
235. Id. 
236. Id. Post-Breeden, two other United States courts of appeals have also acknowledged that the 
participation clause provides more protection than the opposition clause does. See Deravin, 335 
F.3d at 203; Martin v. Mecklenburg County, 151 F. App’x 275, 279 (4th Cir. 2005). In Martin, 
however, the court was careful to note that it felt reluctant to protect an employee who lied during a 
Title VII investigation, proceeding, or hearing, despite acknowledging that the phrase “in any 
manner” could be read to include “unreasonable and irrelevant” activity. 151 F. App’x at 279. 
237. See, e.g., Johnson, 215 F.3d at 582; Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 
1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989). 
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appeals that still apply different levels of protection to the different 
clauses in Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, several United States 
district courts have also continued to do so post-Breeden. Although 
many of these cases did not squarely address the issue, many of them did 
note that the participation clause provides more protection than the 
opposition clause. This approach is consistent with how the majority of 
courts addressed this issue prior to the Court’s Breeden opinion. 
The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina 
issued one such opinion.238 In Whatley v. South Carolina Department of 
Public Safety, although the plaintiff’s claim ultimately failed, the court 
addressed the different levels of protection afforded by the two clauses 
in Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.239 While first noting that the 
opposition clause requires a reasonableness test, the court then observed 
that “[t]he reasonableness test of the opposition clause analysis is 
inapplicable to the consideration of a claim under the participation 
clause.”240 The court reached this conclusion based on the broader 
language found in the participation clause.241 Specifically, the court 
noted that the distinction in the level of protection “is based on the broad 
statutory language . . . with respect to the participation clause.”242 
The United States District Court for the Middle District of North 
Carolina also followed pre-Breeden precedent for the proposition that 
the participation clause provides more protection than the opposition 
clause.243 After determining that the plaintiff’s conduct was not 
protected by the opposition clause, the court addressed the plaintiff’s 
argument that his conduct was protected by the participation clause.244 
Although the court ultimately decided against the plaintiff, the court 
concluded that the plaintiff had engaged in protected activity.245 The 
court noted that the participation clause provided more protection than 
the opposition clause, and that “the participation clause prohibits an 
                                                     
238. Whatley v. S.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 3:05CV00042, 2006 WL 3918239 (D.S.C. Sept. 
1, 2006). As was noted earlier, the Fourth Circuit is another court that has given broad protection to 
individuals seeking protection under the participation clause. See supra note 92. 
239. Whatley, 2006 WL 3918239, at *9–10. 
240. Id. at *10. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. As was mentioned supra note 24, while the opposition clause does not have a “catch-all 
phrase,” the participation clause does indicate that plaintiffs are protected as long as they make a 
charge, testify, assist, or participate “in any manner.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). 
243. Shoaf v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 746, 756 (M.D.N.C. 2003). 
244. Id. at 755–56. 
245. Id. at 756. 
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employer from discharging an employee in retaliation for giving 
testimony in a Title VII proceeding because ‘the participation clause 
shields even allegedly unreasonable testimony from employer 
retaliation.’”246 The court noted that the Fourth Circuit reached this 
conclusion based on the statute’s language, which “leads inexorably to 
the conclusion that all testimony in a Title VII proceeding is protected 
against punitive employer action.”247 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas 
also noted that the objectively reasonable standard does not apply to 
participation-clause cases.248 In Eugene v. Rumsfeld, the court identified 
the two separate clauses in the anti-retaliation provision and noted that 
while the opposition clause “requires the employee to demonstrate that 
she had at least a ‘reasonable belief’ that the practices she opposed were 
unlawful,”249 the “participation clause, however, does not include the 
‘reasonable belief’ requirement and provides broad protection to an 
employee who has participated in a Title VII proceeding.”250 Thus, even 
though this opinion was issued six months after Breeden, it 
acknowledged a difference in the levels of protection between the 
opposition clause and the participation clause.251 
While many courts are expanding Breeden to cases not involving the 
opposition clause, this section and the preceding section of this Article 
demonstrate that some courts are still providing a greater level of 
protection to participation-clause plaintiffs.252 As the courts continue to 
take different approaches on this issue, and as they continue to debate 
                                                     
246. Id. (quoting Glover v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 412 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
247. Id. (quoting Glover, 170 F.3d at 414). As noted earlier, the language in the participation 
clause protects individuals who make a charge, testify, assist, or participate “in any manner.” 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
248. Eugene v. Rumsfeld, 168 F. Supp. 2d 655, 680 (S.D. Tex. 2001). 
249. Id. (quoting Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 
1989)). 
250. Id. (citing Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 680 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
251. Id. 
252. For another opinion from a United States district court where the court acknowledged a 
greater level of protection for participation-clause claims, see Williams v. Gonzales, No. 
1:04CV00342, 2005 WL 3447885, at *13 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2005), which noted that the 
participation clause does not include the “reasonable belief” requirement. See also Tolbert v. Follett 
Higher Educ. Group, Inc., No. 3:05CV00159, 2006 WL 559462, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 7, 2006) 
(noting that the participation clause affords “exceptionally broad protection to those who take part 
in any sort of activity related to the development or prosecution of a Title VII case,” but that the 
opposition clause “requires the plaintiff . . . to have a good faith, reasonable belief that the practice 
opposed is unlawful”); Thompson v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 344 F. Supp. 2d 971, 984 (E.D. Tex. 
2004) (noting that the participation clause does not incorporate the reasonable belief standard). 
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the scope of the Breeden opinion, it is clear that the Supreme Court will 
have to answer two questions. First, must plaintiffs pursuing claims 
under the opposition clause demonstrate an objectively reasonable belief 
that the behavior they were opposing violated Title VII?253 Second, if 
opposition-clause plaintiffs must meet that standard, does that standard 
also apply to participation-clause plaintiffs? The remainder of the Article 
will address the second question and argue that even if an objectively 
reasonable requirement exists under the opposition clause, the same 
requirement should not exist under the participation clause.254 
VI. WHY BREEDEN SHOULD NOT APPLY TO PARTICIPATION-
CLAUSE CASES 
There are several reasons why courts should not apply Breeden’s 
dicta to participation-clause cases. First, as is the case with any issue 
involving statutory interpretation, the initial inquiry begins with the 
statute’s language, and Title VII’s language grants very broad protection 
under the participation clause.255 Second, the agency charged with 
enforcing Title VII, the EEOC, has clearly articulated its belief that the 
objectively reasonable standard should not apply to the participation 
clause.256 Although the EEOC Compliance Manual does not have the 
force of regulation, courts should defer to its position on this issue 
because (1) the EEOC’s position is persuasive; (2) it is entirely 
consistent with the statutory text; and (3) it certainly furthers, rather than 
frustrates, Title VII’s purposes. Third, as a remedial statute, Title VII 
should be interpreted broadly, and applying Breeden to the participation 
clause narrows, rather than broadens, Title VII’s protections.257 Finally, 
                                                     
253. This was the specific question the Court refused to answer in Breeden. Clark County Sch. 
Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001). The Court also declined an opportunity to address this 
issue when it denied certiorari in Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir.), 
reh’g en banc denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2036 
(2007). 
254. See Rosenthal supra note 15, at 1149–76 (arguing that the objectively reasonable standard 
should not apply to opposition-clause cases). There are, however, additional reasons why the 
objectively reasonable standard should not apply to cases brought pursuant to the participation 
clause. These reasons will be addressed in Part VI. 
255. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). 
256. See Compliance Manual, supra note 4, at § 8-II. This belief is in contrast to the EEOC’s 
position with respect to opposition-clause cases, where the agency adopted the objectively 
reasonable standard. Id. 
257. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. EEOC, 405 F.3d 840, 847 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that 
Title VII is a remedial statute and should be construed broadly); Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 
25 F.3d 194, 199–200 (3d Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII 
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and most importantly, relying on Breeden for the idea that the 
objectively reasonable standard applies to participation-clause cases is 
inappropriate because Breeden never addressed the participation clause, 
and because Breeden never definitively decided the correct standard for 
opposition-clause cases.258 Therefore, courts should reject the approach 
currently followed by the Seventh Circuit, the Third Circuit,259 and all 
other courts that apply Breeden to participation-clause cases, and they 
should instead continue to provide broad protection for participation-
clause plaintiffs. 
A. The Participation Clause’s Plain Language Supports an Expansive 
Interpretation 
Pre-Breeden, almost all courts provided extremely broad protection to 
participation-clause plaintiffs, and they applied a lower level of 
protection to opposition-clause plaintiffs.260 Even in a post-Breeden 
world, some courts still provide greater protection to participation-clause 
plaintiffs than they do to opposition-clause plaintiffs.261 One of the 
reasons for this distinction is the plain language of Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for 
employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-
management committee controlling apprenticeships or other 
training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to 
discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization 
to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for 
membership, because he has opposed any practice made an 
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he 
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
                                                     
should be broadly construed to further the goal of preventing employer retaliation). 
258. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270–72 (2001). 
259. As was noted earlier, the Third Circuit has not definitively answered this question. In one 
opinion, the court noted in dicta that the same standard applies to both opposition-clause cases and 
participation-clause cases. See Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006). In 
another opinion from the Third Circuit, the court noted in dicta that different standards apply to the 
different types of cases. See Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 266 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
547 U.S. 1207 (2006). See also supra note 154. 
260. LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 2, at § 2.40. 
261. See discussion supra Parts V.C and V.D. 
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subchapter.262 
Unlike the opposition clause, the participation clause includes the catch-
all phrase, “participated in any manner.”263 Based upon this difference 
between the two clauses, and based upon the first canon of statutory 
construction—that the statute’s plain language should govern a statute’s 
interpretation—many courts have granted (and still grant) more 
protection to plaintiffs filing suit under the participation clause.264 
One court that has relied on this plain language argument is the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.265 In Glover v. 
South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, the court addressed whether 
the plaintiff’s deposition testimony (given as part of another pending 
lawsuit not involving the plaintiff) constituted protected activity.266 The 
question arose because the plaintiff made negative comments about 
other individuals involved in the initial litigation, and she suffered an 
adverse action as a result of her “performance” at her deposition.267 She 
then filed a retaliation claim against her former employer.268 When 
addressing whether the plaintiff’s deposition testimony was protected 
under the participation clause, the former employer argued that the 
testimony was not protected because it was unreasonable.269 Rejecting 
the employer’s contention that the testimony had to be reasonable, the 
court noted that “[r]eading a reasonableness test into section 704(a)’s 
                                                     
262. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000) (emphasis added). I acknowledge the possibility that the “in 
any manner” language could refer to other possible activities in which a potential employee could 
participate, and not necessarily to the state of mind the employee has when engaging in those 
activities. This interpretation would therefore limit the “in any manner” language to activities such 
as serving as a witness, testifying, assisting in an investigation, providing evidence, etc., and would 
not immunize employees who engage in those activities unreasonably or in bad faith. 
263. Id. 
264. The typical starting point for interpreting a statute is its plain language. See Robinson v. 
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). Courts can ignore the plain language only if applying it 
would frustrate Congress’s goals behind the legislation or if applying the plain language would 
yield bizarre results. See Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(citing Royal Foods Co. v. RJR Holdings, Inc., 252 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2001)) (noting that 
courts can ignore a statute’s language if following the language would yield “bizarre results”); see 
also Nat’l. Pub. Radio v. FCC, 254 F.3d 226, 230 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that courts can ignore a 
statute’s language if applying the language would frustrate the statute’s purpose) (relying on Envtl. 
Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). In this case, however, applying the 
participation clause’s plain language furthers, rather than frustrates, congressional intent and does 
not yield bizarre results. 
265. See Glover v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999). 
266. Id. at 412–13. 
267. Id. 
268. Id. at 413. 
269. Id. at 413–14. 
Washington Law Review Vol. 83:345, 2008 
384 
participation clause would do violence to the text of that provision and 
would undermine the objectives of Title VII.”270 The Fourth Circuit 
elaborated: 
The plain language of the participation clause itself forecloses 
us from improvising such a reasonableness test. The clause 
forbids retaliation against an employee who “has made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner” in a protected 
proceeding. [The plaintiff] was fired because she “testified” in a 
Title VII deposition. The term “testify” has a plain meaning: 
“[t]o bear witness” or “to give evidence as a witness.” 
Moreover, those who testify in Title VII proceedings are 
endowed with exceptionally broad protection. The word 
“testified” is not preceded or followed by any restrictive 
language that limits its reach. In fact, it is followed by the phrase 
“in any manner”—a clear signal that the provision is meant to 
sweep broadly. Congress could not have carved out in clearer 
terms this safe harbor from employer retaliation. A 
straightforward reading of the statute’s unrestrictive language 
leads inexorably to the conclusion that all testimony in a Title 
VII proceeding is protected against punitive employer action.271 
The Fourth Circuit continued: 
But the scope of protection for activity falling under the 
participation clause is broader than for activity falling under the 
opposition clause. This is because of the opposition clause’s 
different text—the ambiguous term “oppose” has the potential to 
include a wide range of informal activity ranging from petitions 
to militant self-help. . . . But as we have noted, the text of the 
participation clause is unambiguous and specific. Testifying in a 
Title VII proceeding is plainly protected participation—the 
clause neither requires nor allows further balancing.272 
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit made it clear that with respect to this form 
of participation, it was not going to apply the opposition clause’s 
reasonableness standard.273 
Several other courts have also recognized that the participation 
clause’s unqualified language supports granting more protection to 
participation-clause plaintiffs. For example, a United States district court 
                                                     
270. Id. at 414 (emphasis added). 
271. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) and BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1476 (6th ed. 1990)) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
272. Id. at 415 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
273. Id. 
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from within the Fourth Circuit recognized that Title VII’s language 
supports a broader level of protection for participation-clause 
plaintiffs.274 In Whatley, the court observed the following: “The 
reasonableness test of the opposition clause analysis is inapplicable to 
the consideration of a claim under the participation clause. This 
distinction is based on the broad statutory language . . . with respect to 
the participation clause.”275 Another district court echoed this sentiment 
when it stated that a “straightforward reading of the participation 
clause’s unrestrictive language ‘leads inexorably to the conclusion that 
all testimony in a Title VII proceeding is protected against punitive 
employer action.’”276 Even Judge Colloton acknowledged in Gilooly that 
there is a “respectable textual argument” that supports the position that 
the participation clause provides greater protection than the opposition 
clause.277 
Although there might be some policy reasons not to protect all 
participation activities,278 especially those undertaken in bad faith,279 the 
participation clause’s plain language indicates that courts should protect 
all activities. Because providing unlimited protection to individuals 
seeking protection under this provision will not yield “bizarre results,” 
nor will doing so conflict with Title VII’s purposes, courts should follow 
the provision’s language and provide unlimited protection to these 
plaintiffs.280 This plain-language argument is not, however, the only 
                                                     
274. Whatley v. S.C. Dep’t. of Public Safety, No. 3:05CV00042, 2006 WL 3918239, at *10 
(D.S.C. Sept. 1, 2006). 
275. Id. (emphasis added). 
276. Shoaf v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 746, 756 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (quoting Glover, 
170 F.3d at 414). 
277. Gilooly v. Mo. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 421 F.3d 734, 742 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(Colloton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
278. The most common justification for not providing such broad protection is that courts do not 
want employees to obtain permanent job security simply by filing multiple charges of 
discrimination. See Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 890–91 (7th Cir. 2004). This was 
addressed more thoroughly in the discussion of Mattson earlier in this Article, supra Part V.A. Also, 
the court in Moore v. Principi, No. 1:00CV02975, 2003 WL 21281765, (N.D. Ill. June 4, 2003), 
echoed the Mattson concerns when it noted that “an employee should not be able to acquire 
indefinite tenure by peppering his employer with frivolous complaints.” Id. at *4. 
279. See Mattson, 359 F.3d at 890–91; Moore, 2003 WL 21281765, at *4. 
280. See supra text accompanying note 264. Such a rule could result in an employee’s abuse of 
the EEOC process; however, limiting the participation clause’s protection would undermine 
Congress’s goal of providing “unfettered access to [Title VII’s] remedial mechanisms.” Robinson v. 
Shell Oil Inc., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997). If forced to choose between giving greater protection to 
those who legitimately need it (and risk providing a sword to employees who would use Title VII 
illegitimately) and limiting the protection afforded by the statute, the courts should choose the 
former. As was mentioned supra note 229, one possible alternative is to provide protection under 
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reason courts should grant broad protection to plaintiffs pursuing claims 
under the participation clause. As the next section of this Article will 
demonstrate, there is no reason why the courts should not defer to the 
EEOC’s position on this issue—that all participation-clause activity is 
protected, even if it is unreasonable. 
B. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Persuasive 
Position Is Consistent with the Participation Clause’s Plain 
Language and Furthers, Rather than Frustrates, Title VII’s 
Purposes 
The agency responsible for enforcing Title VII is the EEOC.281 The 
EEOC has drafted a Compliance Manual, which, although not entitled to 
the deference owed to administrative regulations,282 deserves attention. 
In the Compliance Manual, the EEOC agrees with the Court’s dicta in 
Breeden that only complaints based on a reasonable, good-faith belief of 
unlawful employer practices are protected under the opposition 
clause;283 however, the EEOC disagrees with those courts that have 
decided that the same standard applies to the participation clause.284 
With respect to the anti-retaliation provision’s participation clause, 
the Compliance Manual indicates that “participation is protected 
regardless of whether the allegations in the original charge were valid or 
reasonable.”285 The Compliance Manual also indicates that the statute 
does not “limit or condition in any way the protection against retaliation 
                                                     
the participation clause as long as employees act in good faith, regardless of whether they act 
reasonably. 
281. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-8, 2000e-9 & 2000e-12 (2000). 
282. Most courts acknowledge that the Compliance Manual is not entitled to the same level of 
deference as administrative regulations. See Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 90 n.3 (1st Cir. 
2005) (noting that the Compliance Manual is entitled to deference “only to the extent [it has] the 
power to persuade”); Ebbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 319 F.3d 103, 115 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting 
that the Compliance Manual is not subject to “the kind of deliberateness or thoroughness that gives 
rise to significant deference,” and stating that the Compliance Manual is “automatically at the lower 
end of the Skidmore scale of deference”); Singh v. Green Thumb Landscaping, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 2d 
1129, 1137 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (noting 
that the EEOC’s position is entitled to deference depending on “the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, 
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control,” and rejecting the 
EEOC’s position because it was “entirely lacking in the extensive analysis and thoroughness 
necessary to be entitled to substantial deference by the Court” and because the EEOC’s position 
conflicted with the “plain and unambiguous” language of Title VII). 
283. Compliance Manual, supra note 4, at § 8-II, 8-3–8-21. 
284. Id. at 8-9–8-11. 
285. Id. at 8-10. 
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for participating in the charge process.”286 In distinguishing the 
participation clause from the opposition clause, the Compliance Manual 
provides that “[w]hile the opposition clause applies only to those who 
protest practices that they reasonably and in good faith believe are 
unlawful, the participation clause applies to all individuals who 
participate in the statutory complaint process.”287 Finally, and apparently 
not foreseeing that courts would begin to use Breeden in participation-
clause cases, the Compliance Manual indicates that “courts have 
consistently held that [an employer] is liable for retaliating against an 
individual for filing an EEOC charge regardless of the validity or 
reasonableness of the charge.”288 
Although the Compliance Manual is not entitled to Chevron 
deference,289 the Supreme Court has indicated that the EEOC guidelines 
“do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which 
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”290 With respect to 
the EEOC’s positions articulated in its Compliance Manual, some courts 
have agreed with the EEOC’s positions and accepted them with respect 
to the issue of this Article and with respect to other issues involving 
Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes.291 One opinion that 
specifically cited to the EEOC Compliance Manual when confronted 
with the issue discussed in this Article was the previously discussed 
Slagle v. County of Clarion.292 In Slagle, although the plaintiff was 
ultimately unsuccessful in his claim, the court looked to the EEOC 
Compliance Manual regarding the level of protection afforded by the 
participation clause.293 Specifically, the court in Slagle noted that once 
the plaintiff files a facially valid claim, the participation clause’s 
protections provide him with “broad protections.”294 The court noted that 
several courts and the EEOC have taken this position, and it then 
                                                     
286. Id. 
287. Id. (emphasis added). 
288. Id. (emphasis added). 
289. See supra note 282 regarding the level of deference owed to the positions taken by the 
EEOC in its Compliance Manual. 
290. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141–42 (1976)). Admittedly, the EEOC’s position on the issue involved in 
this Article is found in its Compliance Manual, not in its guidelines. 
291. See discussion supra Parts V.C and V.D; Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(following the Compliance Manual’s position with respect to whether involuntary participation in a 
Title VII proceeding constitutes protected activity). 
292. 435 F.3d 262 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1207 (2006). 
293. Id. at 268. 
294. Id. 
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specifically cited to section 8–II of the Compliance Manual for the 
proposition that a plaintiff is protected under the participation clause 
“regardless of whether the allegations in the charge were valid or 
reasonable.”295 
The Supreme Court also adopted an EEOC position regarding Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation provision in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.296 In 
Robinson, when deciding whether former employees were covered by 
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, the Court relied on the EEOC’s 
amicus brief and the position taken by the EEOC in its Compliance 
Manual.297 According to the EEOC, excluding former employees from 
Title VII’s protections would undermine Title VII’s purposes and would 
allow employers to terminate employees who might bring discrimination 
claims.298 Agreeing with the EEOC, the Court noted that the EEOC’s 
arguments “carry persuasive force given their coherence and their 
consistency with a primary purpose of antiretaliation provisions: 
Maintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”299 
The Supreme Court has also adopted other positions from the EEOC 
Compliance Manual, although not necessarily in the context of Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation provision. For example, although the Court in 
Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells 300 acknowledged 
that the Compliance Manual is not controlling,301 it agreed with the 
Compliance Manual with respect to how to determine which workers are 
considered “employees” under the Americans with Disabilities Act.302 
The Court specifically noted that agency interpretations contained in 
compliance manuals do not warrant Chevron deference,303 but believed 
that in that particular case, the EEOC’s position in the Compliance 
Manual was correct.304 
                                                     
295. Id. (quoting Compliance Manual, supra note 4, at § 8-II, and relying on Johnson v. Univ. of 
Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir. 2000); Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 
1994); Proulx v. Citibank, N.A., 659 F. Supp. 972, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). 
296. 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997). 
297. Id. at 345–46. 
298. Id. at 346. 
299. Id. 
300. 538 U.S. 440 (2003). 
301. Id. at 449 n.9. 
302. Id. at 449–51. 
303. Id. at 449 n.9, 451; see also supra note 282 and accompanying text. But see Nilsson v. City 
of Mesa, 503 F.3d 947, 953 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that the EEOC Compliance Manual is 
entitled to Chevron deference). 
304. See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 448–51. Admittedly, the Supreme Court has not always agreed 
with the EEOC’s position. For example, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482–87 
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The Supreme Court has noted that the EEOC constitutes “a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
properly resort for guidance.”305 Although the Court has not directly 
addressed the EEOC’s position with respect to the specific issue of this 
Article, the EEOC’s position on this issue is persuasive, consistent with 
the anti-retaliation provision’s plain language,306 and furthers the goals 
of that provision.307 Furthermore, if individuals are not protected when 
they make what turn out to be incorrect statements or take unreasonable 
actions, the likelihood that they will be willing to participate in any Title 
VII proceedings will be diminished. 
Several courts, in addition to the Supreme Court in Robinson and 
Burlington Northern, have noted that giving a broad interpretation to 
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, as the EEOC suggests, is essential 
to the statute’s effectiveness.308 For example, in Glover, the Fourth 
Circuit indicated that it was critical to provide individuals with broad 
protection under the participation clause.309 The court noted that limiting 
the broad protection and implementing the Breeden reasonableness 
standard to participation activities would frustrate Title VII’s purposes 
and lead to other problems.310 Specifically, the court noted: 
In fact, to adopt a reasonableness restriction would lead the 
federal courts into a morass of collateral litigation in 
employment discrimination cases. With [the witness’s] 
immunity limited by a reasonableness requirement, a witness 
might be forced to evade or refuse to answer deposition 
questions . . . . The inevitable clashes between inquisitive 
deposing attorneys and recalcitrant witnesses will spawn 
discovery motions and appeals, all to be litigated in the courts. 
The resulting waste of individual and judicial resources would 
                                                     
(1999), the Court rejected the EEOC’s position; however, in that case, the Court concluded that the 
EEOC’s position conflicted with the plain language of the ADA. 
305. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (relying on Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141–42 (1976)). The Court in Meritor was referring to the EEOC’s 
guidelines and not its Compliance Manual; nonetheless, the Court did acknowledge that the EEOC 
is experienced in matters involving employment discrimination. To see how other courts have 
treated the issue of how much deference to give to the Compliance Manual, see supra note 282. 
306. See discussion supra Part VI.A. 
307. In cases where the Court rejected the EEOC’s position, it was usually because the Court 
determined that the EEOC’s position conflicted with the plain language of the statute. See, e.g., 
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482–87. 
308. See cases cited supra note 257. 
309. Glover v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414–15 (4th Cir. 1999). 
310. Id. at 415. 
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be far inferior to a system in which discovery proceeds 
unfettered, with witnesses confident that they cannot be 
punished for telling their tales.311 
The court in Glover further explained its concern with imposing a 
reasonableness requirement under the participation clause when it noted 
that “[i]f a witness in a Title VII proceeding were secure from retaliation 
only when her testimony met some slippery reasonableness standard, she 
would surely be less than forth-coming.”312 Thus, the Fourth Circuit 
clearly articulated its belief that the reasonableness requirement should 
not apply to the participation clause.313 This is consistent with the 
EEOC’s position on this issue, and it certainly furthers, rather than 
frustrates, Title VII’s goals. As such, courts should resist the trend of 
applying the Breeden dicta to participation-clause cases, and they should 
continue to give the broad protection Congress intended the participation 
clause to provide. 
Several United States district courts have also concluded that a broad 
interpretation for the participation clause is essential to fulfilling the 
anti-retaliation provision’s goals. For example, the court in Whatley 
relied on Laughlin v. Metro Washington Airports Authority314 and 
observed that “activities under the participation clause are essential to 
the machinery set up by Title VII.”315 Also relying on Laughlin, the 
District Court of South Carolina repeated the same statement when 
deciding that the participation clause’s protection is broader than that of 
the opposition clause.316 Finally, the court in Shoaf v. Kimberly-Clark 
Corp.317 relied on Laughlin for the proposition that activities protected 
under the participation clause “are essential ‘to the machinery set up by 
Title VII.’”318 
Not applying the Breeden dicta to participation-clause cases is 
entirely consistent with the EEOC’s position. However, the EEOC’s 
                                                     
311. Id. 
312. Id. at 414. 
313. Id. at 414–15. 
 314. Laughlin v. Metro Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 1998). 
315. Whatley v. S.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 3:05CV00042, 2006 WL 3918239, at *10 (D.S.C. 
Sept. 1, 2006) (quoting Laughlin v. Metro Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 n.4 (4th Cir. 
1998)) (emphasis added). 
316. Walters v. Benedict Coll., No. 3:04CV00952, 2006 WL 644442, at *7 (D.S.C. Mar. 10, 
2006). 
317. 294 F. Supp. 2d 746 (M.D.N.C. 2003). 
318. Id. at 755–56 (quoting Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 259 n. 4); Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 
679–80 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that the plaintiff’s visit with an EEOC counselor was protected 
activity, and that it was “in the machinery set up by Title VII”). 
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persuasive position and that position’s consistency with Title VII’s 
language and goals are only two of several reasons why courts should 
refuse to apply the reasonableness standard to participation-clause 
claims. Courts should also hesitate before imposing a more restrictive 
standard to these cases because, as the next section of the Article will 
demonstrate, remedial statutes such as Title VII should be given broad, 
rather than narrow, interpretations. Applying this canon of statutory 
construction will help further the purposes of Title VII and its anti-
retaliation provision, and is more likely lead to work environments free 
from impermissible discrimination. 
C. Because Title VII Is a Remedial Statute, Courts Should Give the 
Anti-Retaliation Provision a Broad, Rather than a Narrow, 
Interpretation319 
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether the 
objectively reasonable test is the correct test to apply in retaliation cases, 
it has had the opportunity to hear some cases involving Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision.320 In its anti-retaliation jurisprudence prior to 
Breeden, and in some cases post-Breeden, the Court has typically given 
a broad interpretation to the anti-retaliation provision.321 This is entirely 
consistent with the canon of statutory construction that remedial statutes 
should be interpreted broadly.322 
One of the first cases in which the Court addressed Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision was Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.323 In Robinson, the 
Court addressed whether the anti-retaliation provision covered former 
employees as well as current employees and job applicants.324 Title VII’s 
language limited the class of individuals protected by the anti-retaliation 
provision to “employees” and “applicants for employment,”325 and as a 
                                                     
319. Because this argument applies to both the opposition clause and  the participation clause, it 
appears here and in my previous Article regarding Title VII’s opposition clause. See Rosenthal, 
supra note 15, at 1150–57. 
320. These cases include Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 
(2006), and Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
321. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 63–65; Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346. 
322. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm’rs v. EEOC, 405 F.3d 840, 846–47 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting 
that Title VII is a remedial statute and should be construed broadly); Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of 
Educ., 25 F.3d 195, 199–200 (3d Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that the anti-retaliation provision of 
Title VII should be broadly construed to further the goal of preventing employer retaliation). 
323. 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
324. Id. at 339. 
325. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). 
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result, the Fourth Circuit concluded that former employees were not 
covered.326 The Supreme Court reversed.327 
In Robinson, the plaintiff had been fired, and he subsequently filed a 
charge of racial discrimination.328 While the EEOC was investigating 
that charge, the plaintiff applied for a position with another company, 
and during the hiring process, his former employer provided a negative 
job reference.329 Believing that the negative job reference was retaliation 
for filing an EEOC charge, the former employee sued his former 
employer.330 The district court and the circuit court both ruled in favor of 
the former employer, believing that the anti-retaliation provision did not 
apply to former employees; however, because of the circuit split on the 
issue, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.331 
Relying on the fact that a narrow construction would not cover 
discharged employees, and relying on the EEOC’s position on this issue, 
the Court ultimately decided that former employees were covered under 
the anti-retaliation provision.332 The Court noted that a narrow 
interpretation of the term “employee” would run counter to the anti-
retaliation provision’s purpose and would deter discrimination victims 
from coming forward with their complaints.333 According to the EEOC, 
such a narrow interpretation would “provide a perverse incentive for 
employers to fire employees who might bring Title VII claims.”334 The 
Court acknowledged the strength of the EEOC’s position, commenting 
that it was consistent with the anti-retaliation provision’s “primary 
purpose,” which is to maintain “unfettered access to statutory remedial 
mechanisms.”335 The Court concluded as follows: 
The EEOC quite persuasively maintains that it would be 
destructive of this purpose of the antiretaliation provision for an 
employer to be able to retaliate with impunity against an entire 
class of acts under Title VII—for example, complaints regarding 
discriminatory termination. We agree with these contentions and 
                                                     
326. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325, 332 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev’d, 519 U.S. 337 
(1997). 
327. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 339. 
328. Id. 
329. Id. 
330. Id. at 340. 
331. Id. 
332. Id. at 345–46. 
333. Id. 
334. Id. at 346 (citing EEOC Amicus Brief at 18–21). 
335. Id. 
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find they support the inclusive interpretation of “employees” in 
§ 704(a) that is already suggested by the broader context of Title 
VII.336 
The Court therefore ended up giving a broad interpretation to Title VII’s 
anti-retaliation provision, believing that such a reading was consistent 
with the Act’s goal of providing victims of discrimination “unfettered 
access” to statutory remedies.337 
More recently, the Court expressed its view on the importance of Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation provision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe 
Railway Co. v. White.338 Although that case primarily answered the 
question of what constitutes an “adverse employment action” under the 
anti-retaliation provision, the Court emphasized throughout its opinion 
the importance of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision and how a narrow 
interpretation of that provision would have a chilling effect on an 
employee’s willingness to oppose or participate against a potentially 
unlawful employment practice.339 In Burlington Northern, the plaintiff 
claimed her employer retaliated against her after she complained about 
sexist comments.340 The plaintiff alleged that as a result of these 
complaints, her job responsibilities were changed, and that she was 
suspended.341 After a jury ruled in the plaintiff’s favor, the defendant 
appealed to the Sixth Circuit.342 The Sixth Circuit eventually heard the 
matter en banc and affirmed the judgment on the retaliation count.343 On 
certiorari, the Court was asked to decide whether the plaintiff suffered an 
employment action sufficiently severe to constitute an “adverse 
employment action.”344 
Although the Court focused on the particular issue of what constitutes 
an “adverse employment action,” there were several parts of the Court’s 
opinion that demonstrated its belief that the anti-retaliation provision 
should be interpreted broadly rather than narrowly. First, the Court noted 
that the anti-retaliation provision seeks to secure the elimination of 
discrimination by “preventing an employer from interfering (through 
                                                     
336. Id. 
337. Id. 
338. 548 U.S. 53 (2006), aff’g White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 
2004). 
339. See id. at 63–65. 
340. Id. at 58. 
341. Id. 
342. Id. at 59. 
343. Id.  
344. Id. at 60–61. 
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retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement 
of the Act’s basic guarantees.”345 The Court then stated that a limited 
construction of the anti-retaliation provision would “fail to fully achieve 
the anti-retaliation provision’s ‘primary purpose,’ namely, 
‘[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.’”346 
The Court noted that the EEOC had consistently maintained that the 
anti-retaliation provision should provide “exceptionally broad 
protection” to those who protest discriminatory employment practices.347 
Finally, the Court noted the following: 
Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the cooperation of 
employees who are willing to file complaints and act as 
witnesses. “Plainly, effective enforcement could thus only be 
expected if employees felt free to approach officials with their 
grievances.” Interpreting the anti-retaliation provision to provide 
broad protection from retaliation helps assure the cooperation 
upon which accomplishment of the Act’s primary objective 
depends.348 
Therefore, although not directly addressing the issue involved in this 
Article, the Court in Burlington Northern did express the view that Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation provision should be interpreted broadly.349 
Lower federal courts have also recognized the broad remedial 
purposes of Title VII, both in the anti-retaliation context and in cases 
involving the substantive prohibition against discrimination.350 This is 
consistent with the canon of statutory construction that remedial statutes 
should be interpreted broadly.351 In the context of Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision, courts have already interpreted the statute broadly 
to a certain extent; although they recognize that the provision’s language 
requires that an employee’s opposition be to a practice that is, in fact, 
unlawful, courts have interpreted that provision to include complaints 
made about conduct that the employee reasonably, and in good faith, 
                                                     
345. Id. at 63. 
346. Id. at 64 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)). 
347. Id. at 65 (quoting Compliance Manual, supra note 4, at § 8-II, at 8-13 (1998)). 
348. Id. at 67 (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMaria Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960)) 
(citations omitted). 
349. See id. at 63–65. 
350. See, e.g., Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., 224 F.3d 701, 706–07 (7th Cir. 
2000); Little v. United Tech., Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997); Moyo v. 
Gomez, 32 F.3d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir.), amended by 40 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 1994); cf. Steger v. 
Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 894 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that the ADA is a remedial statute and 
should be interpreted broadly). 
351. See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
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believes is unlawful.352 However, if more courts start taking the Mattson 
approach and start limiting the protections afforded by the participation 
clause (and continue to interpret this remedial legislation narrowly, 
rather than broadly), employees will be less likely to file charges, and 
they will also be less likely to cooperate with the EEOC. This, of course, 
would frustrate Title VII’s goal of eliminating workplace discrimination. 
In addition to the previously discussed reasons why courts should not 
apply Breeden to participation-clause cases, there are two more reasons 
why courts should not do so. First, the Court in Breeden was not asked 
to address the standard for participation-clause cases; and second, the 
Court in Breeden failed to definitively state that the objectively 
reasonable standard was appropriate for opposition-clause cases.353 As a 
result, courts such as the Seventh Circuit in Mattson should reconsider 
their positions on this issue and provide more protection to participation-
clause plaintiffs. 
D. The Breeden Court Never Addressed Title VII’s Participation 
Clause, nor Did It Conclusively Establish a Reasonableness 
Requirement for Any Retaliation Claims 
Had the Supreme Court actually addressed the issue of what standard 
applies to Title VII participation-clause cases, subsequent courts’ 
decisions to apply that standard to participation-clause cases would have 
been understandable—and required. However, as this next section will 
illustrate, not only did the Court in Breeden fail to address that specific 
issue, it also failed to affirmatively articulate the proper standard for 
opposition-clause cases.354 Therefore, the fact that some courts are now 
using Breeden as authority for the proposition that the objectively 
reasonable standard applies to participation-clause cases is troubling, 
especially to plaintiffs suing their employers under that provision. 
1. The Breeden Court Was Confronted with an Opposition-Clause 
Case, not a Participation-Clause Case 
As previously mentioned, Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision 
protects two types of activities—opposition and participation.355 Pre-
Breeden, most courts distinguished between the two clauses and their 
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respective scopes of protection to determine whether the plaintiff had 
engaged in protected activity.356 “Participation” plaintiffs received more 
protection than “opposition” plaintiffs,357 and the lines were fairly clear 
with respect to which actions constituted “participation” and which 
actions constituted “opposition.” 
In Breeden, the plaintiff brought an “opposition” case, as her lawsuit 
was based on how her employer reacted to her internal complaint about 
co-worker conduct.358 Post-Breeden, several participation-clause 
plaintiffs have attempted to point out this distinction, but many courts 
have rejected the argument that Breeden does not apply to participation-
clause cases.359 The most relevant comment on this specific issue came 
from Mattson, where the court stated the following: 
While we acknowledge that the Supreme Court did not apply the 
reasonableness requirement in a participation clause context, the 
Supreme Court did also not hold that the reasonableness 
requirement only applies to the opposition clause. Because the 
Supreme Court did not distinguish between opposition and 
participation claims, we also decline to do so and hold that the 
good faith, reasonableness requirement applies to all Title VII 
claims.360 
This statement from Mattson is peculiar in two respects. First, Mattson 
clearly acknowledged that the Breeden Court did not apply the 
objectively reasonable standard to a participation-clause case,361 thus 
making Breeden distinguishable from Mattson. Second, and more 
peculiar, is the fact that Mattson read an objectively reasonable 
requirement into participation-clause cases despite the fact that the 
Breeden Court did not even have to address participation-clause cases 
because it was not confronted with one.362 The most likely reason the 
                                                     
356. See cases cited supra note 19. 
357. LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 2, at 100–02. 
358. Breeden, 532 U.S. at 269–70. The plaintiff also alleged that she suffered an adverse 
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Breeden Court did not distinguish between opposition-clause claims and 
participation-clause claims is because it did not have to do so; it was 
confronted only with an opposition-clause claim.363 
The Seventh Circuit in Mattson therefore relied on what the Court did 
not write in Breeden rather than what it did write. Although it certainly 
would have been more understandable had the Mattson court read 
Breeden as incorporating an objectively reasonable standard only into 
opposition-clause cases, to do so in the participation-clause context is an 
example of a court stretching the Supreme Court’s Breeden opinion to 
reach its desired result. By interpreting Breeden to require an objectively 
reasonable standard in a participation-clause case, Mattson stretched 
Breeden past what its words suggested. Breeden did not address the 
participation clause; therefore, applying that opinion to participation-
clause cases expands Breeden beyond its intended scope. 
Similarly, and just as peculiarly, the court in Neely also used the fact 
that the Breeden Court did not address participation-clause claims to 
come to the conclusion that Breeden did apply to them.364 Specifically, 
the Neely court, when addressing the Tenth Circuit’s post-Breeden 
Crumpacker decision, indicated that: 
Notably, the Tenth Circuit did not state that “retaliation 
opposition claims” must be based on reasonable, good-faith 
belief; it stated that “retaliation claims” in general are governed 
by Breeden. This court reads Crumpacker to hold that Breeden 
added an objective, reasonableness inquiry into both opposition 
and participation retaliation cases.365 
Thus, despite the fact that the participation clause was not at issue in the 
first part of the Breeden opinion,366 this is an example of another court 
using the Court’s Breeden opinion to conclude that the objectively 
reasonable standard applied to participation-clause cases. However, as 
was the case in Mattson, relying on Breeden for the proposition that the 
objectively reasonable standard applies to participation-clause cases is 
inappropriate, as both courts relied on what the Breeden Court did not 
write rather than on what it did write. 
Mattson and Neely used verbal gymnastics to justify the result they 
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apparently wanted to achieve. By looking at what the Court did not write 
(because the Court was not confronted with the issue), rather than what 
it did write (which standard possibly applies to opposition-clause 
claims), Mattson and Neely were successful in limiting the scope of Title 
VII’s participation clause. This will frustrate, rather than further, the 
purpose behind Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. However, as the 
next section of this Article will demonstrate, courts that limit the 
participation clause have done so not only by looking at what the 
Breeden Court did not even address, but also by applying Breeden’s 
dicta regarding the opposition clause’s objectively reasonable standard 
to participation-clause cases even though the Court never definitively 
determined that the objectively reasonable test applies to opposition-
clause cases.367 
2. The Breeden Court Never Determined That the Objectively 
Reasonable Standard Applies to Opposition-Clause Cases 
The second reason that it is inappropriate for courts to apply 
Breeden’s dicta regarding the opposition clause’s objectively reasonable 
standard to participation-clause cases is that the Court in Breeden never 
even definitively adopted such a standard for opposition-clause cases.368 
Specifically, when determining whether the Ninth Circuit should have 
reversed the summary judgment in favor of the employer, the Court 
noted: 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has applied § 2000e-
3(a) to protect employee “oppos[ition]” not just to practices that 
are actually “made . . . unlawful” by Title VII, but also to 
practices that the employee could reasonably believe were 
unlawful. We have no occasion to rule on the propriety of this 
interpretation, because even assuming it is correct, no one could 
reasonably believe that the incident recounted above violated 
Title VII.369 
The Court was clear that it specifically refused to decide which standard 
applied to opposition-clause cases.370 Although some courts have read 
this language to incorporate a reasonableness standard into opposition-
clause and participation-clause cases,371 Kennedy v. General Motors 
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Corp.,372 a post-Breeden case, acknowledged the Court’s “non-decision” 
when it stated that the Breeden decision was “somewhat curious in that 
the Court seems to have held the plaintiff to the more stringent 
‘reasonable belief’ test, concluded that the plaintiff’s claim failed under 
the more stringent test, but declined to determine whether the test was 
the appropriate standard.”373 Therefore, the Kennedy court recognized 
that Breeden did not even decide which test was appropriate for 
opposition-clause cases.374 
Thus, as Kennedy realized, the Court in Breeden did not definitively 
establish the proper standard to use when analyzing opposition-clause 
cases. Despite this lack of a conclusive answer, and despite a failure to 
address whether such a standard applies to participation-clause cases, 
some courts have used Breeden in the participation-clause context.375 As 
this Article has pointed out, courts should not continue to pursue this 
path. Instead, they should keep the participation clause’s extremely 
broad protection intact. 
As this section has demonstrated, courts relying on Breeden for the 
proposition that the objectively reasonable requirement applies to 
participation-clause cases have read Breeden too broadly. First, Breeden 
never addressed the scope of the participation clause’s protection.376 
Second, the Breeden Court failed to conclusively establish that the 
objectively reasonable standard applied to opposition-clause cases.377 
Despite these two glaring distinctions between Breeden and 
participation-clause cases, the trend of applying Breeden to 
participation-clause cases appears to be gaining momentum. As long as 
this trend continues, courts will continue to chill participation-type 
activities, and the congressional intent underlying the participation 
clause will continue to be frustrated.  
CONCLUSION 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Breeden, several courts have 
interpreted Breeden too broadly and have applied it to cases involving 
Title VII’s participation clause. Ignoring years of precedent indicating 
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that the participation clause provides more protection than the opposition 
clause, these courts have limited the protection afforded by Title VII’s 
participation clause, and as a result, have made it less likely for 
individuals to either pursue their own claims under Title VII or to help 
other individuals pursue their claims against their common employer. 
Although there might be some justification for not extending protections 
to individuals who act in bad faith, taking away protection from people 
who in good faith, but unreasonably, “participate” in any manner in a 
Title VII proceeding will serve only to stifle employee complaints, and it 
will provide employers with more protection when they take adverse 
employment actions against employees whom they feel harm the 
company by participating in EEOC activities. 
Fortunately, not all courts are giving Breeden such a broad reading. 
The reasons supporting a narrower interpretation of Breeden certainly 
outweigh any reason for expanding Breeden beyond its intended scope. 
First, the plain language of Title VII’s participation clause provides 
broad protection to participation-clause plaintiffs by protecting 
individuals who file a charge, assist, testify, or participate “in any 
manner” in an EEOC proceeding.378 If Congress wanted to limit the 
scope of participation-clause protection, it certainly could have chosen to 
limit the participation clause’s language rather than drafting the 
provision in such a way that allows for an expansive interpretation. 
Second, the EEOC’s position, which is persuasive and entirely 
consistent with the statute’s language, supports limiting Breeden to 
opposition-clause cases and providing greater protection to individuals 
seeking relief under the participation clause. Additionally, the EEOC’s 
position furthers, rather than frustrates, Title VII’s purpose. Third, as a 
remedial statute, Title VII should be interpreted broadly, and expanding 
Breeden to apply to participation-clause cases does just the opposite—it 
narrows the level of protection afforded by the statute. Finally, the Court 
in Breeden was addressing an opposition-clause case, and it never even 
addressed the appropriate standard that should govern participation-
clause cases. Further, the Court never definitively answered which was 
the proper standard to apply to opposition-clause cases. Despite the 
numerous reasons that counsel against applying Breeden to 
participation-clause cases, several courts have done just that. 
Therefore, although the current trend appears to be to expand Breeden 
and limit Title VII’s protections, courts should resist this urge and rely 
on years of prior case law that provided a greater level of protection for 
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participation-clause plaintiffs than for opposition-clause plaintiffs.379 
This will help further the remedial purposes of Title VII, and it will 
encourage, rather than discourage, individuals to pursue their own 
claims of discrimination and help co-workers pursue their claims of 
discrimination. This will be a step in the right direction toward 
eliminating all impermissible discrimination from the workplace. 
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